Understanding phenomenal experience as a natural part of our world

自然科学？物理、化学和生物？为我们的世界提供令人信服的描述。然而，它们没有公开提及精神状态，特别是具有现象学意义的精神状态：如瘙痒和色彩体验的状态。自然主义者面临的挑战是在自然主义者的图景中定位这些状态。这个项目发展并借鉴了表征主义的心理描述，来解释如何在自然主义者的画面中定位具有现象学的心理状态。这将产生关于机器精神生活的新视角。

The natural sciences?physics, chemistry and biology?provide compelling accounts of our world. They contain, however, no overt mention of mental states and in particular the mental states with a phenomenology: states like itches and colour experiences. The challenge for naturalists is locate these states within the naturalist picture. This project develops and draws on representationalist accounts of mind to explain how to locate mental states that have a phenomenology within the naturalist's picture. This will yield new perspectives on the mental lives of machines.