Designing Efficient and Equitable Voting Mechanisms

最常用的集体决策方法，即多数投票，通常效率不高，因为它不允许选民表达他们偏好的强度。此外，多数投票还面临多数人的暴政，即一再将少数群体排除在代表之外的风险。多数投票的最后一个缺点是它的赢家通吃的性质，即它不会为失去的选民提供补偿。本项目涉及设计替代机制，以避免这些缺点，并有力地提供高效和公平的结果。该项目开发了这些新机制背后的理论，在一系列环境中测试它们，并交付实际使用的实现。

The most commonly used method for collective decision making, majority voting, is generally not efficient as it does not allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences. In addition, majority voting suffers from the tyranny of the majority, i.e. the risk of repeatedly excluding minority groups from representation. A final downside of majority voting is its winner-take-all nature, i.e. it provides no compensation for losing voters. This project concerns the design of alternative mechanisms that avoid these shortcomings and robustly deliver efficient and equitable outcomes. The project develops the theory underlying these novel mechanisms, tests them in a range of environments, and delivers an implementation for practical use.