Welfare Analysis of Network Public Utility Industries : A Real Options Approach

研究项目的目的是通过实物期权方法对电力、电信、天然气等网络公用事业行业进行福利分析。以下两篇论文介绍了本研究项目所做的贡献：1。基于接入价格规则的地方网络所有者合作投资研究了网络所有者之间的竞争环境。研究了在基于接入成本的接入定价条件下企业投资网络设施的战略机会，并对合作投资和非合作投资进行了比较。分析建议在接入定价和投资制度之间采取政策组合，以实现理想的网络工业环境。当接入定价涉及更高（更低）比例的接入成本水平时，合作投资机制比非合作投资机制获得更高（更低）的社会福利。本文考察了不确定性条件下企业对网络产业进行不可逆投资的激励。我们描述了一个进入者的战略选择的接入费用溢价和增量利润流累积从接入绕过。研究表明，在网络行业引入竞争有助于提高消费者福利，因为有竞争时进入的时间比没有竞争时更早。此外，我们确保允许有机会访问在位者的网络设施，使进入者构建旁路的动机减弱。讨论了接入收费对投资的影响。

The purpose of the research project is to provide a welfare analysis of network public utility industries, like electricity, telecommunication, natural gas, etc., through a real options approach. The contributions made by the research project are presented in the following two papers.1. Cooperative investment of local network owners under an access pricing ruleThis paper examines a competitive environment among network owners. It studies their strategic opportunities to invest in network facility under access pricing based on access costs, and then compares a cooperative investment regime with a non-cooperative investment regime. The analysis recommends a policy mix between the access pricing and the investment regime to achieve a desirable network-industry environment. When the access pricing involves a higher (lower) proportion level of access costs, the cooperative investment regime achieves higher (lower) social welfare than the non-cooperative investment regime.2. From access to bypass : a real options approachThis paper examines firms' incentives for irreversible investments in network industries under uncertainty. We characterize an entrant's strategy choice in terms of an access charge premium and an incremental profit flow accrued from access to bypass. It is shown that an introduction of competition in network industries contributes to an enhancement of consumer welfare in the sense that the timing of entry becomes earlier with competition than without competition. In addition, we ensure that allowing the opportunity to have access to an incumbent's network facility makes an entrant's incentive to construct a bypass weak. The effect of access charge on the investment is also discussed.