Studies on the Transparency in International Trade and International Investment Dispute Settlement

本研究项目旨在通过国际经济法学者和非政府组织领导人的国际联合研究，通过以下方式阐明提高国际贸易和投资争端解决透明度的可能性：(1)分析围绕这些争端解决程序的透明度的理论问题；(2)审查提高这些争端透明度的各种政策建议。2008年和2009年，研究小组在学术聚会上举行了两次小组讨论(国际经济法学会成立大会(2008年7月，日内瓦大学)和亚洲国际法学会第二次会议(2009年8月，东京大学)，每个小组成员都就自己的研究专题作了发言。2010年，每个成员在讨论了彼此的发言后，请他/她撰写关于其研究专题的最后论文。在编写本报告时，除费利西亚诺大法官外，所有法官都提交了他/她的…。更多的文件。在收到费利西亚诺法官的论文后，项目负责人将与丹尼尔·马格劳先生共同撰写一篇导言，并将所有论文汇编成一本名为《国际贸易和投资争端解决的透明度》的编辑书籍，将由剑桥大学出版社(CUP)出版。项目负责人已经与国际足联进行了接触，并收到了后者对出版的积极回应。研究结果的详细内容将载于上述书籍。研究结果概述如下：(1)WTO争端解决和投资仲裁的透明度可根据(I)争端程序是否向公众公开，以及(Ii)有关文件(争端各方提交的材料和裁决机构的最终决定(专家组和上诉机构的报告以及仲裁裁决)是否公开以及在多大程度上公开)来评估。(2)这些争端程序不如国内法院程序和国际裁决(如国际法院)透明，但比国际商事仲裁更透明。这可能是因为(I)争端各方(世贸组织成员国政府、东道国和外国投资者)的性质，(Ii)争端标的的特点(两者都涉及国内监管的合法性，但它们间接涉及私营公司的利益)，以及(Iii)两者都允许在程序之外的各方之间谈判交易的可能性。(3)另一方面，在这两个程序中，国内公共政策的合法性经常存在争议，这引起了争端国家公众的担忧，因此对更多透明度的要求越来越高。(4)因此，有必要在这些争端解决过程的具体特点(见上文(2))和公众要求更高透明度的合理要求(见上文(3))之间取得微妙的平衡，我们在此建议每个争端解决过程提高透明度，同时考虑到(1)问题的特点和(2)争端当事方的特征，以及(3)保护争端私人当事人的商业机密的需要。然而，一位成员声称，没有必要提高世贸组织争端解决程序的透明度，因为一些争端案件可能更好地通过进口国的国内法院程序解决，在那里确保了更高的透明度。较少

This research project aimed at elucidating the possibility of enhancing transparency in international trade and investment dispute settlement through an international joint research of scholars of international economic law and NGO leaders by (i) analyzing the theoretical issues surrounding transparency in these dispute settlement procedures, and (ii) examining various policy proposals for enhancing transparency in these disputes. In 2008 and 2009, the research team held two panels in academic gatherings (Inaugural Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (July 2008, Geneva University) and the Asian Society of International Law 2nd Conference (August 2009, University of Tokyo)), and each member of the team made presentations on his/her research topic.In 2010, each member engaged him-/herself in writing final paper on his/her research topic, after discussing each other's presentations. At the time of this report, all members except Justice Feliciano have submitted his/her … More papers. Upon receiving Justice Feliciano's paper, the project leader will co-author an introduction with Mr.Daniel Magraw, and will compile all the papers in an edited book titled Transparency in International Trade and Investment Dispute Settlement, to be published from Cambridge University Press (CUP). The project leader has already contacted with the CUP, and has received a positive response toward publication from the latter.The details of the research result will be contained in the above book. Following are the outline of the research result :(1) Transparency in WTO dispute settlement and investment arbitration may be evaluated in light of (i) whether the dispute procedure is open to the public, and (ii) whether and to what extent the relevant documents (disputing parties' submissions and final decisions of the adjudicating bodies (reports of the Panel and the Appellate Body and arbitral awards) are publicly available.(2) These dispute procedures are less transparent than domestic court procedures and international adjudication (e.g., International Court of Justice) bur are more transparent than international commercial arbitration. This may be explained by (i) the character of the disputing parties (WTO member governments and host states and foreign investors), (ii) the characteristics of the subject matter of the disputes (both deal with the legality of domestic regulation but they indirectly touch on the interests of private firms), and (iii) both allows for the possibility of negotiating deals between the parties outside of the procedure.(3) On the other hand, in both procedures, the legality of domestic public policy are frequently at issue, which raises the concern of general public of the disputing states and thus an increasing demand for more transparency.(4) It is, therefore, necessary to strike a delicate balance between the specific characteristics of these dispute settlement process (see (2) above) and the justifiable demand for more transparency by the general public (see (3) above), and we hereby suggest that each dispute settlement process enhance transparency, taking into consideration (i) the characteristics of the issues and (ii) the characteristics of the disputing parties, and (iii) the need to protect business confidentiality of the private parties involved in the dispute. One member, however, asserts that there is no need to enhance more transparency in WTO dispute settlement process, because some dispute cases might be better solved through domestic court procedure of importing countries, where more transparency is secured. Less