AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT UNDER THE INTERNAL CONTROL RULE IN JAPAN

这项研究考察了日本的盈余管理。我们显示了公司收益的扭曲分布，表明存在操纵行为，以避免报告亏损。我们发现，在本财年的最后一个季度，预测误差大幅减少。Tazawa复杂的库存估算模型检测到了与潜在的会计操纵相一致的证据，这些会计操纵是为了避免报告损失而进行的“成本或市场较低”。这项研究揭示了日本汽车业通过库存实现收入平滑的证据。最后，我们考察了利用特殊利润(如获利交易)来补偿巨额特殊损失的显性操纵行为。

This study examines earnings management in Japan. We show kinky distribution of corporate earnings suggesting manipulation to avoid reporting losses. We find a large rate of reduction in forecasts errors in the last quarter of the fiscal year. Tazawa's sophisticated model for inventory estimation detects evidence consistent with potential accounting manipulation of "lower of cost or market" to avoid reporting losses. This study reveals evidence suggesting income smoothing behavior through inventories in Japanese automobile industry. We finally examine explicit manipulation using special profit, such as gain trading, for compensating big special losses.