Incentive contracts under long-term relationship

在与长期关系下的激励契约相关的几点中，笔者发现了契约双方信息不对称导致交易成本产生的条件。关键是关于所承包项目的盈利能力的信息的准确性以及合同协议谈判中的时间偏好。特别是，当精度为中等且时间偏好不是那么高时，由于低效协议而导致的交易成本相对较高。此外，我们还证明，随着精度的提高，协议趋于有效协议，因此交易成本变得更小。

Among the points pertaining to incentive contracts under long-term relationship, I find the conditions under which the transaction cost arises due to contracting parties' asymmetric information. The key is the accuracy of information about the profitability of the project to be contracted upon and the time preference in the bargaining for contract agreement. In particular, the transaction cost due to inefficient agreement becomes relatively higher if the accuracy is medium and the time preference is not so high. Also, I show that as the accuracy improves, the agreement approaches to the efficient one and therefore the transaction cost is becoming smaller.