Analysis of International Tax Policy in Endogenous Timing Model

本研究考察了国际税收竞争模型中的内生时机。与现有的研究不同，假设政府不仅要决定税率，还要决定税率是早是晚。纳什均衡为双重免税额的选择提供了三个结论。首先，税收减免引起同时的税收竞争，而税收抵免产生连续的税收竞争。其次，任何税收规则都会产生资本交易。第三，一个国家的情况比减税好，而另一个国家的情况比减税差。

This study examines endogenous timing in an international tax competition model. Unlike existing studies, governments are assumed to decide not only tax rates but also whether they are set early or late. The Nash equilibrium provides three conclusions for alternative double tax allowances. First, tax deductions cause simultaneous tax competition, whereas tax credits yield sequential tax competition. Second, any tax rules would generate capital trade. Third, one country is better off but another is worse off with credits than deductions.