Mechanism design of matching agreements on global environmental issues

我从两个方向扩展了我自己之前关于全球环境问题匹配协议有效性的研究。首先，在非对称情况下，存在一个匹配规则，其中有效协议与对称情况一样是自我执行的。其次，当我们考虑签署国与非签署国行动之间的相互依赖关系时，允许存在不承诺匹配的国家，可以同时满足效率和自我执行。因此，配对协定在更现实的框架内已证明是有效的

I have extended my own previous researches concerning the effectiveness of matching agreements on global environmental issues in two directions. First, in the case of asymmetric countries, there exists a matching rule where the efficient agreement is self-enforcing just as the symmetric case. Second, the efficiency and the self-enforcement can be satisfied at the same time when we consider the interdependencies between the actions of signatories and those of non-signatories by allowing the existence of countries that do not commit to the matching. Thus, matching agreements have turned out to be effective in more realistic frameworks