Policy Determination under Non-democratic Regimes : A Game-theoretic Political Economy Approach

(1)利用二战后国际冲突的数据建立了一个新的（地理）政治不稳定性指数，并证明该指数与每个非民主国家的增长率具有很强的正相关关系。(2)构建了政治精英战略性地使用再分配政策来镇压群众抗议的政治经济学模型，证明了在非民主国家，物质资本回报率、遗产动机的强度和人力资本禀赋的数量是决定所采取的政策是促进增长还是抑制增长的关键因素。(3)利用税收优惠的政治经济学模型，论证了这种由政治任人唯亲导致的歧视性政策会产生低效要素运动的多米诺骨牌反应，并可能产生期望驱动的多重均衡和经济不稳定。

(1) I make a new index of(geo) political instability using the data of international conflicts after World War II and demonstrate that the index has a strong positive correlation to the growth rate of each non-democratic country.(2) Constructing a political economy model in which political elite strategically use redistributive policy in order to suppress masses' protests, I demonstrate that the rate of returns on physical capital, the strength of bequest motive, and the amount of human capital endowment are critical factors that determine whether the adopted policies are growth-enhancing or growth-suppressing in non-democratic countries.(3) Using a political economy model of preferential taxation, I demonstrate that such a discriminatory policy induced by political cronyism causes a domino reaction of inefficient factor movements, which may generate expectation-driven multiple equilibria and economic instability.