Reconsidering the Post-war Consensus Thesis

本研究旨在对战后英国政治提供一种新的解读。人们通常将战后英国政治划分为以战后共识为基础和以新自由主义共识为特征的两个时期，而撒切尔政府则被视为从战后共识向新自由主义共识转变的催化剂。我们的研究通过关注英国历届政府所推行的对外经济政策来挑战这一观点。我们发现，20世纪70年代的希思和卡拉汉政府奉行的政策组合，这是相当不同的战后和新自由主义的共识。卡拉汉政府特别试图减少英国长期的国际收支赤字，实现出口导向型经济增长。参与新提出的欧洲货币体系被认为是一个理想的目标，以补充这一新的经济战略，但由于国内的反对，政府无法将磅纳入新的计划。只有将撒切尔政府与这两届政府进行比较，我们才能理解它的新奇。

The purpose of this research is to offer a new interpretation on postwar British politics. It is common to divide postwar British politics into two periods-one based on the postwar consensus and the other characterized by the neo-liberal consensus-with the Thatcher government regarded as a catalyst of the change from the former to the latter. Our research challenges this view by focusing on external economic policy pursued by the successive British governments. We find out that the Heath and Callaghan governments of the 1970s pursed a policy mix which is quite different from both the postwar and neo-liberal consensus. The Callaghan government in particular tried to reduce Britain's chronicle balance of payment deficit and achieve export-led economic growth. Participation in a newly proposed European monetary system was regarded as a desirable objective to complement this new economic strategy, though the government could not bring the pound into the new scheme due to domestic opposition. We will be able to understand the novelty of the Thatcher government only by comparing it with these two governments.