Equilibrium Coordination in the Implementation Problem: Is the Truth-Telling Equilibrium Salient?

在执行理论中，从理论上看，所设计的机制具有多个均衡并不重要，因为这些均衡结果与社会目标的定义一致。然而，当这些机制在实践中使用时，“均衡协调问题”就出现了，即代理人如何决定在这些均衡中选择哪一个均衡。最近盛行的直接揭示机制足够简单，可以有多种均衡。因此，解决均衡协调问题是一个重要的问题。本研究通过经济实验表明，在直接揭示机制中，如果有多个均衡的机制存在说真话均衡，则均衡在这些均衡中是显著的。这意味着说真话的均衡可能成为一个焦点(谢林(1960))。

In implementation theory, it does not matter from the theoretical viewpoint that the designed mechanism has multiple equilibria, since those equilibrium outcomes coincide with the social goal by definition. However, when those mechanisms are used in practice, the "equilibrium coordination problem" arises, i.e., how do agents decide which equilibrium to choose among those equilibria. Direct revelation mechanisms, which prevail recently, are simple enough to have multiple equilibria. So, it is an important problem to solve the equilibrium coordination problem. This study shows by economic experiments that in a direct revelation mechanism, if the mechanism which has multiple equilibria has the truth-telling equilibrium, the equilibrium is salient among thoseequilibria. This implies that the truth-telling equilibrium could become a focal point (Schelling (1960)).