A theoretical analysis of a keyword auction: How rational the current settings of keyword auction are

本研究项目的目的是通过博弈论分析和计算机模拟来探讨当前关键字拍卖设置的合理性。在第一个研究中，我们探讨了一个搜索引擎的插槽供应策略。基于博弈论分析的收益预测，我们发现限制搜索结果页面的广告数量和突出显示顶部广告与卖家的收益最大化是一致的。在第二项研究中，我们探讨了在密封出价环境下的广告客户的出价行为，其中每个竞标者都不知道其他人的当前出价。结果表明，即使在封闭的竞价环境下，在单次博弈中，广告主的竞价轮廓也会收敛到某个平衡点。仿真结果验证了密封投标环境对搜索引擎是有利的。

The purpose of this research project is to explore how rational the current settings of keyword auctions are by means of a game theoretic analysis and a computer simulation.In the first study, we explore a slot supply strategy of a search engine. Based on the revenue prediction from a game theoretic analysis, we show that restricting the number of the ads in a search result page and highlighting the top ads are consistent with the revenue maximization of the sellers.In the second study, we explore the bidding behavior of advertisers in a sealed-bid environment, where each bidder does not know the current bids of others. It is shown that even in a sealed bid environment, bid profie of advertisers converges to some equilibrium point in a one-shot game. Simulation results verify that a sealed-bid environment would be beneficial to search engines.