The Balance of Power: Analysis of Interstate Wars and Peaceful Resolutions of Conflict, 1000-2000 AD

发表关于联合国安全理事会选举的第一篇论文[Caro-Burnett and Weese 2023]。 与Johann Caro Burnett（广岛大学）共同开展了国际气候协定的政治经济学的后续研究。与David Schonholzer（斯德哥尔摩大学）的联合研究包括为2023年9月至2024年6月访问斯德哥尔摩大学做准备。 冲突模型的一些进展：合作博弈联盟形成模型似乎不容易分析涉及两个以上的球员的战争。 对理论文献的搜索显示，很少有理论论文分析三个或更多玩家的对称战争博弈，并且存在的少量论文似乎都不可能导致合理的估计策略。 特别是，对于非合作形式的博弈，我们可以放弃参与者必须在战争中选择一方的限制，而且必须正好有两方。 如果我们允许任何玩家与任何其他玩家战斗，那么战争模型就变成了一个更标准的网络形成模型，其中任何边缘（即战争）都可以在给定的时间段内存在或不存在。& Weese，E.（2023年）。联合国安全理事会选举作为遵约的激励措施。冲突解决期刊，0（0）。https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231153575

Publication of first paper on UN security council elections [Caro-Burnett and Weese 2023]. Follow-up work on political economy of international climate agreements now underway, also with Johann Caro Burnett (Hiroshima University).Joint research with David Schonholzer (Stockholm University) involved preparations for sabbatical visit to Stockholm University September 2023 - June 2024. Some progress on models of conflict: cooperative game coalition formation models appear to not be analytically tractable for wars involving more than two players. A search of the theoretical literature reveals very few theory papers analyzing a symmetric game of war with three or more players, and none of the small number of papers that do exist seems likely to lead to a reasonable estimation strategy.Non-cooperative form games may be more useful. In particular, with non-cooperative form games we can abandon the restriction that players must choose a "side" in the war, and that there must be exactly two sides. If we allow any player to fight any other player, then the model of war becomes a more standard network formation model, where any edge (i.e. war) is allowed to either exist or not exist in a given period.Reference:Caro-Burnett, J., & Weese, E. (2023). UN Security Council Elections as an Incentive for Compliance. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231153575