The gender gap in pay progression: job mobility and job ladders

在英国，性别薪酬差距中位数从1970年的36.4%（O'Reilly，Smith等人，2015年）大幅下降到最新数据（ONS 2018年）的18%左右。尽管如此，按照国际标准，薪酬差距仍然很高：英国的性别薪酬差距在欧盟排名第四，在经合组织国家中排名第八（OECD 2019）。研究人员和政策制定者把重点放在教育和劳动力市场经验方面的性别差异上，认为这可能是薪酬差距的驱动因素。然而，今天这些解释不再经得起推敲。妇女的平均受教育程度高于男子，她们不太可能长期退出劳动力市场。尽管如此，妇女的收入平均比男子低10%，即使她们从事全职工作，而且具有类似的教育和劳动力市场经验。虽然对妇女潜在的较低生产力作为两性工资差距的原因的解释进行了彻底调查，发现不充分，但关于雇主所起作用的证据较少。这项研究将有助于弥补这一差距。劳动力市场的标准经济模式假定工资由市场决定，个别雇主不能选择他们向雇员提供的工资。另一种不同的模型假设，由于各种原因，竞争并不完美，雇主对他们提供的工资有一定的自由裁量权。当工人是移动的时，这种工资设定能力可能会减弱。移动的工人将离开提供低于市场工资的雇主。然而，如果工人相对固定，雇主可以通过提供较低的工资来利用这种“固定”。如果妇女在她们将从事的工作类型或她们可以用于求职的时间和精力方面受到家庭责任的更多限制，她们通常会更不灵活，从而处于不利地位。女性的家庭责任可能最终导致男女工资差距，但这并不是因为女性的家庭责任限制了她们的生产力，而是因为女性的家庭责任降低了她们与企业的谈判能力。本研究课题将从两个方面探讨雇主的工资决定权在推动男女工资差距方面所起的作用。首先，利用英国最大的纵向研究的数据，它将调查男女之间工作流动模式的差异程度，以及是否有任何差异可以解释观察到的工资增长方面的性别差距。第二，根据地理位置、行业和旅行费用等因素，制定雇主工资决定权指数，并检验该指数是否能够解释工资增长中的性别差异。解决男女工资差距问题是政策制定者、政党、妇女团体、工会和雇主组织的共同目标。更好地了解造成差距的因素对于制定有效的政策至关重要。例如，2017年4月，英国政府要求大型雇主每年报告其组织中的薪酬差距。如果将性别工资差距归咎于妇女生产率较低，那么这种立法可能是无效的，甚至适得其反。另一方面，如果雇主更强的工资决定权是工资差距背后的一个重要因素，则强制性报告可能更有效。更一般地说，如果雇主相对于其某些雇员享有很大的工资确定权，这就对反歧视、最低工资、工会和家庭政策的立法产生影响。

The median gender pay gap has declined dramatically in the UK from 36.4% in the 1970 (O'Reilly, Smith et al. 2015) to around 18% in the most recent data (ONS 2018). Still, by international standards the pay gap is high: the UK has the fourth largest gender pay gap in the EU and the eighth largest of OECD countries (OECD 2019). Researchers and policy makers have focused on gender differences in education and labour market experience as the likely drivers of the pay gap. However, today these explanations no longer stand up to scrutiny. Women are on average better educated than men and they are much less likely to withdraw from the labour market for long periods of time. Nevertheless, women earn on average about 10% less than men even when they work full-time and have similar education and labour market experience. While explanations focusing on women's potential lower productivity as the cause of the gender pay gap have been thoroughly investigated and found inadequate, there is less evidence on the role played by employers. This research will contribute to addressing this gap. The standard economic model of the labour market assumes that wages are determined by the market and that individual employers cannot choose the wages they offer to their employees. A different model assumes that for a variety of reasons competition is not perfect and employers have some discretion over the wages they offer. This wage setting power is likely to be weaker when workers are mobile. Mobile workers will leave an employer offering wages below the market rate. However, if workers are relatively immobile, employers can exploit this 'immobility' by offering them lower wages. If women are more constrained by family responsibilities in the types of jobs that they will take-up or in the amount of time and effort they can devote to job search, they will generally be more immobile and thus at a disadvantage. Women's family responsibilities might be ultimately responsible for the gender pay gap but not because they limit their productivity but rather because they reduce their bargaining power with firms.This research project will examine the role of employer wage-setting power in driving the gender pay gap in two ways. First, using data from the UK's largest longitudinal study, it will investigate the extent to which job-to-job mobility patterns differ between men and women, and whether any differences can explain the observed gender gap in pay progression. Second, it will develop an index of employer wage-setting power based on geographical location, industry and cost of travel and test whether the index can explain gender differences in pay progression.Tackling the gender pay gap is a widely shared goal among policy makers, political parties, women's groups, trade-unions and employer organizations. A better understanding of the factors driving the gap is essential to design effective policies. For example, in April 2017, the UK government has mandated large employers report annually on the pay gap in their organization. If women's lower productivity is to blame for the gender pay gap, such legislation is likely to be ineffective and even counterproductive. On the other hand, mandatory reporting is likely to be more effective if employers' stronger wage-setting power is a significant factor behind the pay gap. More generally, if employers enjoy significant wage setting power relative to some of their employees, this has implications for legislation on anti-discrimination, the minimum wage, trade-unions and family policy.