Negotiating Justice: Responding to Corporate Wrongdoing in Brazil

简而言之，无效的实体法无法解决潜在的激励不对称问题，从而造成有利于公司不法行为的环境，从而产生打击士气的效果。从制度的角度来看，低发现率-这是由于对有良好咨询的公司立案的内在挑战-加上竞争市场的冒险取向，是公司不法行为作为利润最大化的一种形式的合理激励。更重要的是，从个人的角度来看，由于侦查而产生的公司制裁传统上也没有产生最佳的警务，因为它们没有有效地分配犯罪负担。上市公司的管理人员，通常是少数股东，从犯罪中获得的个人利益比犯罪被发现后减少股息所带来的损失要多。因此，巨额罚款的负担不是福尔斯在肇事者身上，而是落在公司商品和服务的股东和消费者身上。因此，对公司而不是对个别不法行为者进行制裁的威胁不具有足够的威慑作用。(ii)研究报告1.公司法人定义中的缺陷如何妨碍对公司实体的有效起诉和判刑？2.在实体刑法的失败造成内在的扭曲的非法动机的情况下，如何将系统性的公司不法行为概念化为预期的合理结果？3.协商司法制度是否是应对这种情况的最有效手段？4.《暂缓起诉协议》如何克服《宽大处理协议》的缺陷，打破发展中国家商业交易的间断性次优均衡？鉴于协商司法在全世界应对公司不法行为方面发挥着日益重要的作用，现有文献仍然有限，主要侧重于发达国家的经验，在这些国家，公司犯罪是准时的，而不是系统的。此外，行为经济学的最新研究揭示了为什么宽恕协议未能改变企业行为，但未能考虑替代政策。关于巴西的案例研究，本研究项目将力求为一个发展不足的领域作出贡献，这一领域的特点是，国内和国际学术界的专门文献明显缺乏，尽管它对巴西今天的立法和经济决策产生了切实的影响。随着Lava Jato案被告最近与美国、瑞士和一些南美和中美洲国家签署了宽大处理协议，该案例研究获得了国际参与和重要性，并被美国司法部称为“历史上最大的外国贿赂案”。

In a nutshell, ineffective substantive laws have a demoralizing effect by failing to address the underlying incentive asymmetries that foster an environment conducive to corporate wrongdoing. From an institutional perspective, low detection rates-resulting from the intrinsic challenges of building cases against well-counseled corporations-coupled with competitive markets' risk-taking orientation represent rational incentives for corporate wrongdoing as a form of profit maximization. More importantly, from an individual perspective, the corporate sanctions that result from detection have also traditionally not resulted in optimal policing as they inefficiently distribute the burden of the offense. Managerial executives of publicly held firms, often minority shareholders, accrue more personal benefit from engaging in crime than lose through decreased dividends if the crime is detected. The burden of the substantial fine thus falls not on the perpetrators but on the shareholders and consumers of the corporations' goods and services. Therefore, the threat of sanctions imposed on the firm, as opposed to the individual wrongdoer, has an insufficient deterrent effect.(ii) Research Questions1. How do shortcomings in the definition of corporate personhood impede the effective prosecution and sentencing of corporate entities?2. How can systemic corporate wrongdoing be conceptualized as the expected rational outcome in settings where the failures of substantive criminal law create inbuilt distorted incentives for illegality?3. Is the institution of negotiated justice the most effective vehicle for responding to such scenarios?4. How can the Deferred Prosecution Agreement overcome the shortcomings of the Leniency Agreement and break the punctuated suboptimal equilibrium of business transactions in developing countries? In light of the increasingly important role played by negotiated justice in responding to corporate wrongdoing around the world, available literature is still limited and focuses greatly on the experiences of developed nations where corporate crime is punctual, rather than systematic. Moreover, recent scholarship in behavioral economics reveals why the Leniency Agreement fails to alter firm behavior but fails to consider alternative policies. Regarding the Brazilian casestudy, this research project will seek to contribute to a sadly underdeveloped field characterized by a marked paucity of specialized literature, both within domestic and international academic circles, despite its tangible repercussions in Brazilian legislative and economic policymaking today. With the recent Leniency Agreements signed by Lava Jato defendants with the United States, Switzerland and a number of South and Central American nations, the case study has gained international involvement and significance and coined "the largest foreign bribery case in history" by the U.S. Department of Justice.