A Security Investigation of Power Line Communication

在过去的几年里，联网设备的数量迅速增加。各种类型的设备，通常是孤立和离线运行，如电表或汽车，正变得越来越互联。这使得设备能够实时共享和交换数据，方便用户的日常生活。然而，为了使这些设备具有成本效益、可靠和容易的集成，需要新的通信手段。电力线通信（PLC）是满足上述要求的技术之一。在过去的几年中，HomePlug电力线联盟（一个由最大的PLC硬件制造商组成的联盟）开发并实施了各种优化，以降低硬件成本，同时增加通信的抗干扰性，同时提高数据速率。由于利用现有的电力电缆传输数据，因此无需安装额外的电线。这降低了成本，也允许设备连接到不可能安装额外电缆的地方。除了在家庭环境中作为WiFi的替代品外，PLC是智能电网的关键技术。实现联合充电系统（CCS）的电动汽车使用PLC与充电站通信，交换充电参数，如电流和充电状态（SOC）。未来，双向通信将允许车辆直接与智能电网通信，并充当能量存储系统来缓冲多余的能量，并在需要时将其注入电网以补偿需求高峰。然而，PLC也有相当大的缺点。它易受各种噪声的影响，特别是背景噪声、窄带噪声和脉冲噪声。这种噪音和干扰可能是由连接在同一电源线上的调光器和吹风机等设备引起的。同时，PLC发出强烈的电磁辐射，甚至干扰业余无线电[2]。[1]证明，在基于CCS的充电会话期间，可以利用这种意想不到的电磁发射泄漏来捕获和解码交换的物理层协议数据单元（ppdu）。在本研究项目中，对电力线通信进行了安全调查。更准确地说，我们将评估来自无线域的主动攻击（如数据包注入）是否可行。此外，还研究了适当的缓解策略，以防止攻击者注入数据包。该项目属于EPSRC安全、隐私和信任研究领域，参考文献：Richard Baker和Ivan Martinovic。丢车钥匙：电动汽车充电中的无线物理层不安全。第28届USENIX安全研讨会（USENIX Security 19），加州圣克拉拉，2019。USENIX协会。[2]Lutz Lampe, Andrea M. Tonello和Theo G. Swart。电力线通信：从多媒体到智能电网的原理、标准与应用Wiley出版社，第二版，2016。

In the last few years, the number of internet-connected devices increased rapidly. Various types of devices that were usually operating isolated and offline, such as electricity meters or cars, are becoming more and more interconnected. This enables the devices to share and exchange data in real time and facilitate the users' everyday life. However, in order to enable a cost efficient, reliable and easy integration of such devices, new means of communication are necessary.Power Line Communication (PLC) is one of the technologies that meets the aforementioned requirements. Over the last few years, the HomePlug Powerline Alliance, a consortium composed of the biggest PLC hardware manufacturers, developed and implemented various optimisations to reduce the costs of the hardware, while increasing the robustness of the communication against interference and simultaneously improve the data rates. Due to the utilisation of existing power cables to transmit data, no additional wires have to be installed. This reduces costs and also allows devices to be connected in places where it would not be possible to install extra cables. Apart from the usage in domestic environments as an alternative to WiFi, PLC is a key technology in the smart grid. Electric vehicles that implement the Combined Charging System (CCS) use PLC to communicate with the charging station and exchange charging parameters, such as current and the State of Charge (SOC). In the future, the bi-directional communication will allow the vehicle to directly communicate with the smart gird and act as an energy storage system to buffer surplus energy and if needed inject it back into the grid to compensate demand peaks. Nevertheless, PLC also has a considerable disadvantage. It is susceptible to different kinds of noise, in particular, to background, narrowband and impulsive noise. This noise and interference can be caused by devices, such as dimmers and hairdryers connected to the same power line. At the same time, PLC emits strong electromagnetic radiation, even so intense that it interferes with amateur radio [2]. [1] demonstrated that it is possible to exploit this unintended leakage of electromagnetic emission during a CCS based charging session to capture and decode the exchanged PHY-layer Protocol Data Units (PPDUs).In this research project, a security investigation of Power Line Communication is carried out. More precisely, we will evaluate if active attacks, like packet injection, from the wireless domain are feasible. In addition, appropriate mitigation strategies are investigated to prevent an adversary from injecting packets. This project falls within the EPSRC Security, privacy and trust research areaReferences[1] Richard Baker and Ivan Martinovic. Losing the car keys: Wireless phy-layer insecurity in EV charging. In 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19), Santa Clara, CA, 2019. USENIX Association.[2] Lutz Lampe, Andrea M. Tonello, and Theo G. Swart. Power Line Communications: Principles, Standards and Applications from Multimedia to Smart Grid. Wiley Publishing, 2nd edition, 2016.