Cryptographic Protocol Security

当组合密码原语来构建协议时，可能很难保证其安全性。即使这种保证是以正式证明的形式给出的，它们有时也依赖于不正确的假设，或者不能准确地模拟它们所宣传的或用户所期望的安全属性。该项目旨在研究这如何导致攻击，并调查如何弥合理论和实践之间的差距。

When cryptographic primitives are combined to construct a protocol, it can be difficult to give guarantees about its security. Even if such guarantees are given in the form of a formal proof, they sometimes rely on incorrect assumptions or do not accurately model the security properties they advertise or that the users expect. This project aims to study how this can lead to attacks, and investigate how the gaps between theory and practice could be bridged.