Critically assessing the 2008 UK financial crisis through the lens of policy, regulatory and state capture

近10年前，英国银行体系险些彻底崩溃。如果没有英国政府最后一分钟的干预，人们预计英国经济将面临长期而持久的萧条。自那以后，人们对这些事件的发生有了一系列解释，其中大多数解释都包括央行官员、监管机构和政府，他们要么没有预见到即将到来的灾难，要么被劝阻没有采取先发制人的行动来避免灾难。人们较少详细研究的是造成这种惯性的原因。在有关美国和英国危机的官方报告中，有一种说法认为，监管机构和央行的不作为是由一种政治哲学造成的，即不鼓励国家机构对曾经蓬勃发展的经济进行不受欢迎的干预。英国议会一个委员会的一位证人将这一理论总结为“监管机构和政治过程被金融部门普遍俘获”。类似的指控也可以针对应对危机的政策，特别是量化宽松和对被认为“大到不能倒”的主要银行的国有化（其中一些随后以低于市场的价格出售）。上述主张的基本假设是，主导的亲银行业意识形态的政策捕获缩小了关键决策者可用的感知选项，从而导致了次优政策结果。拟议中的研究将严格检验这一假设，并评估经验证据在多大程度上支持有关此次危机的相互竞争的理论解释。本研究将试图回答以下问题：-国家、监管和/或政策捕获在多大程度上导致了2008年的金融危机，并确定英国政府、议会、监管机构和英格兰银行随后的政策反应？-如果有的话，这次捕获是如何避免的？如果有的话，会采取什么措施来防止类似的事件再次发生？该项目将通过以下方式寻求进一步的知识：-开发可操作的捕获定义：通过对现有文献的全面批判性参与以及与该领域专家学者的咨询，该研究将产生一个可用于该项目的强大且相关的捕获定义。具体来说，这将批判性地评估捕获的不同定义的效用-政策，监管和国家-为了研究的目的。-精英访谈和分析相关的一手和二手源材料：通过对2008年金融危机前后参与事件的政治家、监管机构和公务员的深入访谈，研究将寻求精英视角来看待金融危机的原因和应对措施。这将旨在探讨精英们对金融危机成因的看法的共性和差异，为围绕金融危机的政策反应的决策过程提供独特的见解，并测试精英们对捕获是导致危机的事件及其后续事件的合理解释这一命题的反应。这项研究将以对有关文件材料和报告的仔细分析为基础。对捕获的可用代理的前沿分析：现有的捕获研究主要集中在一两个变量上，这些变量不足以提供捕获的全面分析，例如，特定行业团体对关键决策者的游说强度。利用新的和以前未发表的数据，该研究将寻求对与所调查的政策领域相关的机构和行为者的捕获代理进行全面分析。

Almost a decade ago the UK banking system narrowly avoided a complete collapse. Without last minute intervention from the UK Government it was anticipated that the UK economy would face a long and protracted depression. Since then there have been a range of explanations for how these events came about, most of which include central bankers, regulators and governments who either failed to see the impending disaster or were dissuaded from taking pre-emptive action to avoid it.What has been examined in less detail is what caused this inertia.Within official reports on the crisis in the US and UK are the suggestion that inaction by regulators and central banks was caused by a political philosophy that discouraged unpopular interventions from state institutions into what had been a booming economy. This theory was summarised by one witness to a UK Parliamentary committee as the "universal capture of the regulators and the political process by the financial sector". Similar allegations could be levelled at the policy responses to the crisis, in particular quantitative easing and the nationalisation of key banks (some subsequently sold at sub-market rates) that were considered 'too big to fail'.The underlying hypothesis of the claims made above is that policy capture by a dominant pro-banking sector ideology narrowed the perceived options available to key decision-makers, which led to sub-optimal policy outcomes. The proposed research will critically examine this hypothesis and assess how far the empirical evidence supports competing theoretical explanations of the crash. This study will seek to answer the following questions:- To what extent did state, regulatory and/or policy capture lead to the financial crash of 2008 and determine subsequent policy responses from the UK Government, Parliament, regulators and Bank of England?- How, if at all, could this capture have been avoided?- What, if anything, has been done to prevent similar capture from happening in the future?The project will seek to further knowledge by:- Developing an operable definition of capture: through a thorough critical engagement with existing literature and consultation with expert academics in this field, the research will produce a robust and relevant definition of capture that can be operationalised for the project. Specifically, this will critically evaluate the utility of different definitions of capture - policy, regulatory and state - for the purpose of the research.- Elite interviews and analysis of relevant primary and secondary source material: through in-depth interviews with politicians, regulators and civil servants involved in the events preceding and following the financial crisis of 2008, the research will seek an elite perspective on the causes and responses to the financial crisis.This will aim to explore commonalities and differences in elite perspectives on the cause of the financial crisis, provide unique insights into the decision-making process surrounding the policy responses to it, and test elite responses to the proposition that capture is a plausible explanation for events leading up, and subsequent, to the crisis. The research will be underpinned by a close analysis of relevant documentary material and reports.Cutting-edge analysis of available proxies for capture: existing research into capture has focussed heavily on one or two variables that are insufficient to provide an all-encompassing analysis of capture, for example, the intensity of lobbying by specific industry groups on key decision-makers. Using new and previously unpublished data, the research will seek to provide a comprehensive analysis of proxies for capture across the institutions and actors relevant to the policy area under investigation.