Care Robots in Residential Homes for the Elderly: An ethical examination of deception, care and consent

我们正处于机器人革命的边缘：未来学家伊恩·皮尔森博士预测，到2050年，人们与栩栩如生的机器人发生性关系的次数将超过与其他人发生性关系的次数。在未来的一二十年里，机器人将渗透到我们的工作场所、家庭和床上;这场革命的影响怎么估计都不为过。密尔提出了他的伤害原则，指出国家干预公民行为的唯一理由是防止对他人的伤害。我的博士学位将是对密尔的伤害原则的批判，根据创造逼真的机器人所产生的一些尖锐的伦理问题。我将研究围绕着模仿特定人的性爱机器人，老年人性爱机器人，机器人保姆和对机器人的暴力行为的伦理问题。我将拒绝最近对伤害的定义（Stewart 2010，Turner 2014），并提出我自己的更广泛的定义，即关于机器人在我们生活中的崛起，伤害应该包括什么。至关重要的是，我认为穆勒的伤害原则应该扩展到包括这四种情况可能产生的心理伤害，我们必须注意，允许对机器人的暴力可能会导致对人的伤害。这个项目建立在我的硕士论文，我认为，创造一个类似于特定人的性爱机器人是错误的，即使没有有害的后果，因为这样做相当于客观化（Nussbaum 1995，Gutiu 2012，Richardson 2016）。我的道德，价值理论和政治哲学硕士课程为我打算探索的社会，政治，法律的和道德雷区提供了良好的基础，我将全面实现区分。我教了14年的A-Level哲学/社会学，在此期间，我一直是一个考官，并发表了三本学术著作。这种丰富的经验发展了可转移的技能，如奉献精神，工作到最后期限，研究，熟悉哲学论点和概念。

We are on the brink of a robotic revolution: futurologist Dr Ian Pearson predicts that by 2050 people will have more sex with lifelike robots than with other people (Telegraph 29.9.15). Robots are set to infiltrate our workplaces, homes, and beds over the next decade or two; the impact of such a revolution cannot be overestimated.In 1859 J.S. Mill put forward his harm principle, stating that the only reason a State can intervene in the actions of citizens is to prevent harm to others. My PhD will be a critique of Mill's harm principle in light of some poignant ethical questions arising from the creation of lifelike robots.I will examine ethical questions surrounding sexbots made to resemble particular people, sexbots for the elderly, robot nannies, and violence against robots. I will reject recent definitions of harm (Stewart 2010, Turner 2014), and advance my own, broader definition of what harm should encompass with regard to the rise of robots in our lives. Crucially, I argue that Mill's harm principle should expand to include psychological harm which can arise from these four scenarios, and we must be mindful that permitting violence towards robots could lead to the harm of people.This project builds on my MA dissertation, in which I argue that it is wrong to create a sexbot to resemble a particular person, even if there are no harmful consequences, because doing so amounts to objectification (Nussbaum 1995, Gutiu 2012, Richardson 2016). My MA modules in Ethics, Value Theory and Political Philosophy provide an excellent grounding in the social, political, legal and ethical minefield I intend to explore, and I am set to achieve a Distinction overall. I've taught A-Level Philosophy / Sociology for 14 years, during which time I've been an examiner and published three academic works. This wealth of experience has developed transferable skills such as dedication, working to deadlines, research, and familiarity with philosophical arguments and concepts.