Towards Platonic Panpsychism: The Timaean metaphysics as a possible solution to the combination problem.

心态如何融入我们关于现实的形而上学故事？在《蒂迈欧篇》中，柏拉图系统地质疑了宇宙的形而上学结构，考察了物理现实与人类灵魂之间的关系。另一方面，近年来，越来越多的心灵哲学家一直在倡导泛心论，认为心理是现实的普遍和基本特征。我认为这些传统的动机是同样的紧迫性：在一个统一的自然观中发展一个令人信服的心灵解释。在我的工作中，我将捍卫一个整体的阅读的蒂迈形而上学，并探讨如何这样一个模型可能有助于解决一些严重的问题泛心论面临的。具体地说，我将主张，通过泛心论的非小版本的透镜，阅读《蒂迈欧篇》中世界灵魂、个体灵魂和物质之间的关系，是回答以下两个问题的关键。采用泛心论的方法来研究心灵和基本性，是否有助于发展对《蒂迈欧篇》的非二元论阅读？柏拉图关于灵魂在自然界中的作用的概念是否可以帮助泛心论者为她的世界观设计一个可行的模型，而不受组合问题的影响？

How does mentality fit into our metaphysical story of reality? In the Timaeus, Plato systematically questions the metaphysical structure of the Cosmos, investigating the relationship between physical reality and human soul. On the other hand, in recent times, a growing number of philosophers of mind have been advocating panpsychism, the view that mentality is a ubiquitous and fundamental feature of reality. I hold these traditions to be motivated by the same urgency: developing a convincing account of mind within a unified conception of nature. In my work, I shall defend a holistic reading of the Timaean metaphysics and investigate how such a model may contribute to solving some serious problems panpsychism is facing. Specifically, I shall contend that reading the relationship between the World Soul, the individual souls and matter in the Timaeus through the lens of a non-smallist version of panpsychism is key to answer the two following questions. Can the adoption of a panpsychist approach to mind and fundamentality help to develop a non-dualistic reading of the Timaeus? Can Plato's conception of the role of soul in the natural world help the panpsychist to design a viable model for her worldview, not affected by the combination problem?