Non-Obviously Manipulable Mechanism Design

非明显可操纵性（Non-obvious manipulability， NOM）是由不完全理性所激发的一种新的激励相容性概念，它允许机制容忍某些操作，只要这些操作对认知有限的主体来说不是“明显的”。与策略证明性（策略证明性规定说真话是一种优势策略）相比，NOM只要求代理比较其效用函数的极端情况，即接管其他参与人的所有可能出价。首先，我们想要研究的是，在何种条件下，我们可以设计出通过支付来实现某些社会选择功能的机制，当这是可能的时候，我们想要了解可以获得什么——关于公平、效率和计算可追溯性等概念——以及什么是不可能的。此外，我们希望将我们的框架应用于文献中许多不同的和经过充分研究的设置，包括拍卖，双边市场和公平分配。

Non-obvious manipulability (NOM) is a new notion of incentive compatibility motivated by imperfect rationality that allows mechanisms to tolerate certain manipulations as long as they are not "obvious" to cognitively limited agents. Contrasted to strategy proofness, which stipulates that truthtelling is a dominant strategy, NOM instead only requires an agent to compare the extremes, taken over all possible bids of the other players, of their utility function. First and foremost we want to study the conditions under which we can design mechanisms that implement certain social choice functions by enhancing them with payments, and when this is possible we want to understand what can be gained -- with regards to notions such as fairness, efficiency, and computational tractability -- as well as what is impossible. In addition we look to apply our framework to a number of different and well-studied settings in the literature, including auctions, two-sided markets, and fair division.