Universal properties of compositional structure in language

语言具有层次化的构成结构；其最小的组成部分--语音或手语中的信号的时间片段(Brentari，2002)--孤立地没有意义，但它们结合在一起形成了有意义的单位，比如单词，再结合起来形成短语，然后是句子，依此类推。在英美和西欧语言学中，我们被训练将这一结构划分为词法、词的内部结构和句法、短语的内部结构(例如，Aronoff和Rees-Miller，2003)。关键是，这种划分依赖于对词的确切定义；否则，我们无法知道词内结构和词间结构之间的界限。但是，尽管几十年来一直致力于制定词汇的普遍诊断方法，但没有一种定义对世界上所有语言都是有效的(参看。Dixon和Aikhenvald，2003；Haspelath，2011；Pike，1952；Tallman，2020；Zwky和Pullum，1983)。因此，现在是从新的角度来处理这个老问题的时候了。我认为，可能没有办法定义“词”，从而区分词法和句法，因为词法和句法可能不是语言的独立子系统，而是一个单一组成系统的两个层面。这一观点得到了对简单的基本认知偏好的支持(Chater和Vitányi，2003)：为什么要有两个组成系统，而一个组成系统就可以了？此外，对语言进化的研究表明，由于要求语言既可学又能表达的竞争压力，语言会进化其组成结构(Kirby等人，2014；Kirby等人，2015)，而这些压力没有原则性的理由来区分单词和句子。基于这个想法，我的项目将采取一种全新的方法来解决词汇问题。我将率先使用最初为发展心理学和语言进化创建的实验方法，以及贝叶斯认知模型，来问：有什么证据表明语言的构成水平之间存在认知差异？为了回答这个问题，我将研究语言的共性及其认知基础。共性是在许多(不相关的)语言中重复出现的特征。因为人类认知决定了语言的形式(Berent等人，2008；Chomsky，1988；Culbertson等人，2012；Fedzechina等人，2012；Ferdinand等人，2019；Hudson Kam and Newport，2005；Kirby等人，2015；Wilson，2006)。我将测试语言共性在词法和句法上是否以同样的方式表现出来。如果他们这样做了，这可能是因为这两个层面都有一个单一的组成系统。我的发现将对理论语言学具有重要意义，因为它们将为该领域一个长期存在的核心问题提供新的证据。

Language has hierarchical compositional structure; its smallest components-speech sounds, or temporal slices of signals in signed language (Brentari, 2002)-are meaningless in isolation, but they combine to create meaningful units like words, which further combine to create phrases, then sentences, and so on. In Anglo-American and Western European linguistics, we are trained to divide this structure into morphology, the internal structure of words, and syntax, the internal structure of phrases (e.g., Aronoff and Rees-Miller, 2003).Crucially, this division depends on having a solid definition of "word"; otherwise, we cannot know where to draw the line between intra-word and inter-word structure. But despite decades of work aiming to formulate universal diagnostics of wordhood, no definition of "word" is valid for all the world's languages (cf. Dixon and Aikhenvald, 2003; Haspelmath, 2011; Pike, 1952; Tallman, 2020; Zwicky and Pullum, 1983). It is therefore time to approach this old question from a new angle. I propose that there might be no way to define "word", and thus to distinguish morphology and syntax, because morphology and syntax might not be separate subsystems of language, but rather two levels of a singular compositional system. This idea is supported by the fundamental cognitive preference for simplicity (Chater and Vitányi, 2003): why have two compositional systems when one would do? Further, research on language evolution has shown that language evolves its compositional structure due to competing pressures for it to be both learnable and expressive (Kirby et al., 2014; Kirby et al., 2015), and there is no principled reason for these pressures to distinguish words from sentences.Based on this idea, my project will take an entirely novel approach to the issue of wordhood. I will pioneer the use of experimental methods originally created for developmental psychology and language evolution, along with Bayesian cognitive modelling, to ask: what evidence is there for a cognitive distinction between levels of composition in language?To answer this, I will investigate language universals and their cognitive basis. Universals are features that recur across many (unrelated) languages. They are often hypothesized to be explained by cognitive principles, since human cognition determines the form that language can take (Berent et al., 2008; Chomsky, 1988; Culbertson et al., 2012; Fedzechkina et al., 2012; Ferdinand et al., 2019; Hudson Kam and Newport, 2005; Kirby et al., 2015; Wilson, 2006). I will test whether language universals manifest the same way in morphology and syntax. If they do, this may be because a single compositional system underlies both levels. My findings will be significant for theoretical linguistics, since they will provide new evidence for a long-standing core issue in the field.