Delusions: Exploring Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Vigilance

在日常的社会交往中，我们通常会承认别人有一些知识，以及真诚和合理地谈论他们所知道的事情的技能。承认这一点对于确保他们在各种情况下得到公平对待非常重要。当这一点缺失时，认知不公正就会发生（Fricker，2007）。当我们不承认某人有知识或能力出于偏见的原因进行交流时，说话者会经历一种可信度赤字;我们认为他们比他们更不可信。我的项目将集中在认识不公正，特别是因为它出现在临床和日常治疗的人谁有妄想。我将探讨两个问题：1。为什么有妄想症的人容易受到认知不公正的伤害？在这里，我将探讨认知警觉的概念，这是我们在评估证词时保持警惕的感觉。我将把这一概念应用到妄想认知的背景下，并论证我们对相信来自妄想主体的虚假信息过于警惕。我还将考虑与妄想（例如临床非理性）相关的负面刻板印象，以及这些刻板印象如何削弱认知能力。在妄想性认知的情况下，我们如何解决认知警觉和认知不公正之间的冲突？我认为，消除在第一个问题中确定的刻板印象，提高认识不公正的临床意识，并注重以病人为中心的护理将减少那些妄想认识不公正的脆弱性。

In everyday social transactions, we typically grant that others have some knowledge, and the skill to speak sincerely and reasonably about what they know. Granting this is important to ensure their fair treatment in a variety of situations. Epistemic injustice occurs when this is missing (Fricker, 2007). When we do not grant that someone has knowledge or the ability to communicate it for prejudicial reasons, the speaker experiences a credibility deficit; we view them as less credible than they are. My project will focus on epistemic injustice specifically as it arises in the clinical and everyday treatment of people who have delusions. I will explore two questions:1. Why are people who have delusions vulnerable to epistemic injustice? Here I will explore the notion of epistemic vigilance, which is the sense of being on our guard when evaluating testimony. I will apply this notion to the context of delusional cognition and argue that we are overly vigilant against believing false information issuing from subjects with delusions. I will also consider the negative stereotypes which are associated with delusions (e.g. clinical irrationality), and how these deflate epistemic credibility.2. How can we resolve the conflict between epistemic vigilance and epistemic injustice in cases of delusional cognition? I will argue that dispelling the stereotypes identified in the first question, increasing clinical awareness of epistemic injustice, and a focus on patient-centred care will reduce the vulnerability of those with delusions to epistemic injustice.