Trade, Investment and Soft Power: Contextualising China's and Taiwan's Relations with the Visegrad 4

本研究的目的是分析中国的经济治国方略和公共外交为台湾在维谢格勒4（V4）国家捷克、斯洛伐克、匈牙利和波兰的外交活动创造的机会和限制。中国在中欧和东欧（CEE）的经济治国方略得到了16+1（原17+1）倡议的推动，该倡议长期以来一直被批评为分裂欧盟。在此背景下，对V4的关注有两个重要原因：（1）中国对V4的贸易和投资流量大于中东欧其他国家，（2）V4国家都是欧盟成员国。捷克和匈牙利是主要的案例研究，而斯洛伐克和波兰提供了比较的视角。随着捷克越来越支持台湾，匈牙利是中国在欧盟最坚定的支持者之一，这两个国家的案例凸显了V4、中国和台湾之间关系的多样性，避免了该地区被视为一个整体的看法。该项目旨在解释捷克与中国和捷克与台湾关系的波动，包括捷克行政机构与立法者和公众之间的分歧态度。捷克与台湾的关系可以追溯到苏联集团解体时，台湾试图利用其经济外交与新政权建立官方关系。一旦中东欧国家承认中华人民共和国而不是中华民国，台湾的经济外交就被公共外交所取代，尽管台湾与捷克商业代表签署的2020年谅解备忘录可能会为台湾在捷克和更广泛的中东欧地区的经济举措创造新的机会。在此背景下，本项目还分析了台湾外交举措的发展，考虑到这些举措在多大程度上是对中国在中东欧和整个欧盟日益增长的经济存在的回应。而捷克则提供了一个洞察中国日益自信的外交为台湾创造的机会，匈牙利强调了台湾在一个日益不自由的政府统治的国家中面临的限制，该政府利用与中国的关系作为对抗欧盟的杠杆。尽管随着政治分歧的出现和公众对政府对华政策日益不满，这种情况可能会发生变化，但该项目分析了匈牙利与台湾关系的限制是由中国的压力造成的，还是匈牙利政府自己强加的。在研究方法上，第一部分将对胡锦涛和Xi近平领导下的捷克与中国、匈牙利与中国的关系进行历史分析，并与陈水扁、马英九和蔡英文领导下的捷克与台湾、匈牙利与台湾的关系并列，该项目分为16+1之前（2002-2012年）和16+1之后（2012年以后）的发展。研究的第二部分将涉及对中国和台湾在捷克和匈牙利以及V4其他国家的贸易和投资流动的经济分析。中国大陆和台湾的外交举措对捷克和匈牙利政策制定者的影响将通过采访总统办公室，执政联盟和反对派的代表进行分析。还将对捷克华人和捷克台湾人以及匈牙利华人和匈牙利台湾人商会进行采访，并将分析捷克和匈牙利媒体报道中与中国/台湾有关的内容以及与中国/台湾媒体的联系。

The aim of this project is to analyse the opportunities and constraints China's economic statecraft and public diplomacy create for Taiwan's diplomatic initiatives within the Visegrad 4 (V4) countries of Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. China's economic statecraft in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is facilitated by the 16+1 (formerly 17+1) initiative, which has long been criticised for dividing the EU. Within this context, the focus on the V4 is significant for two reasons: (1) China's trade and investment flows are larger to the V4 than the rest of CEE, and (2) V4 countries are all EU member states. Czechia and Hungary are the main case studies, whilst Slovakia and Poland provide comparative perspectives. With Czechia being increasingly supportive of Taiwan, and Hungary being one of China's staunchest supporters in the EU, these two country cases highlight the diversity of relations between the V4, China and Taiwan, avoiding the perception of the region as a monolith. The project aims to explain the fluctuations in Czech-Chinese and Czech-Taiwanese relations, including the diverging attitudes between Czech executive bodies on the one hand and legislators and the public on the other. Czech-Taiwanese relations date back to the collapse of the Soviet bloc when Taiwan tried to use its economic diplomacy to establish official ties with the new regimes. Once the CEE countries recognised the PRC instead of the ROC, Taiwan's economic diplomacy was replaced by public diplomacy, although the 2020 memoranda of understanding signed between Taiwanese and Czech business representatives may create new opportunities for Taiwan's economic initiatives in Czechia and broader CEE. Within this context, the project also analyses the development of Taiwan's diplomatic initiatives, considering the extent to which these were a response to China's increasing economic presence in CEE and the EU as a whole.Whereas Czechia provides an insight into the opportunities China's increasingly assertive diplomacy creates for Taiwan, Hungary highlights the constraints Taiwan faces in a country run by an increasingly illiberal government that uses its relations with China as leverage against the EU. Although this may change amidst the emerging political divisions and increasing public dissatisfaction with the government's China policy, the project analyses whether the limitations in Hungarian-Taiwanese relations are caused by Chinese pressures or are self-imposed by the Hungarian government. In terms of methodology, the first part of the research will involve a historical analysis of Czech-Chinese and Hungarian-Chinese relations under Presidents Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, juxtaposed against the Czech-Taiwanese and Hungarian-Taiwanese relations under Presidents Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen, with the project being divided into pre-16+1 (2002-2012) and post-16+1 developments (2012 onwards). The second part of the research will involve an economic analysis of China's and Taiwan's trade and investment flows in both Czechia and Hungary, as well as the rest of the V4. The influence of China's and Taiwan's diplomatic initiatives on Czech and Hungarian policymakers will be analysed through interviews with representatives of the presidential office, governing coalition, and the opposition. Interviews with Czech-Chinese and Czech-Taiwanese, as well as Hungarian-Chinese and Hungarian-Taiwanese business chambers will also be conducted, and Czech and Hungarian media reports will be analysed in terms of their China/Taiwan-related content and links to Chinese/Taiwanese media outlets.