Bolivarian Venezuela: Emerging patterns of civil-military relations in historical perspective

我的研究调查了自1998年已故乌戈·查韦斯当选以来委内瑞拉出现的平民和军队之间的关系。尽管一些研究已经通过军事从属于文官控制的棱镜来审视这些关系，但我们还没有提出对查韦斯主义下的军民模式的多学科评估，以了解其全部含义。1958年，委内瑞拉主要政党签署了《蓬托·菲霍条约》，成功地将军队推回了军营。这种安排是成功的，因为军方和文职精英有共同的目标(恢复民主、游击战等)，但这种模式达到了极限，因为政治制度本身在20世纪80年代经历了合法性危机，最终导致了1992年查韦斯的未遂政变。查韦斯从监狱获释，并于1998年当选，开启了武装部队参与委内瑞拉政治的新纪元。他的意识形态模糊了平民和军事之间的区别，与“公民士兵”的概念有相似之处，后者指的是古巴革命后古巴统治精英的双重性质。这一新方向最初遭到反对，查韦斯在2002年的一次短暂政变中被赶下台，在2002年和2003年面临一系列叛乱。在2000年代中期重新巩固权力后，他启动了委内瑞拉军队的改革进程，清除持不同政见的军官，奖励忠诚，削弱其指挥权。武装部队被赋予对国有企业的直接管理和对自然资源丰富地区的控制，同时也受到情报机构的严格监控。本世纪头十年中期的一个关键事态发展是深化了哈瓦那和加拉加斯之间的军事关系，古巴军官直接向委内瑞拉同行提供咨询和培训。至关重要的是，劳尔·卡斯特罗成功地在古巴实施了委内瑞拉武装部队转型的总体路线--重组军队的使命、剥夺军队的自主权和加强意识形态调整--劳尔·卡斯特罗在2008年之前一直领导着委内瑞拉国防部。古巴模式使查韦斯主义在其创始人去世后仍能继续存在，就像“劳利主义”确保了球迷的忠诚，而不必依赖菲德尔的个人魅力和对士兵的优势。为了研究委内瑞拉的军民模式，我将使用案例研究方法，对委内瑞拉历史的不同时期进行比较：早期和晚期(1958-1998年)；查韦斯早期(1999-2012年)；以及2013-2020年(马杜罗时代)。三个焦点将构成分析的框架：第一，军事使命是如何在国家发展和经济主权的背景下重新安排的，使武装部队在政权中具有很高的利害关系；第二，军队对政权构成生死存亡威胁的能力如何受到削弱其自治权和制衡其权力的变化的影响(例如玻利瓦尔民兵和情报监视)；最后，如何通过新创建的军事机构网络、新的军事训练课程以及在意识形态上与该制度保持一致的军官的招募和晋升来进行意识形态灌输。我的研究目标是：i)对界定委内瑞拉武装部队所采取的体制道路的关键方面进行历史和比较的机构分析；ii)通过过程跟踪，探索委内瑞拉和拉丁美洲其他地区事件之间的联系。据我所知，自查韦斯以来，从未将这样一个整体框架应用于委内瑞拉军民关系的研究。

My research investigates the relationship between civilians and the military that has emerged in Venezuela since the election of the late Hugo Chávez in 1998. Although some studies have examined these relations through the prism of military subordination to civilian control, we are yet to present a multidisciplinary assessment of the civil-military model under chavismo to understand its full implications.In 1958, the main political parties in Venezuela signed the Pact of Punto Fijo, which successfully pushed the military back into the barracks. This arrangement was successful insofar as military and civilian elites shared common goals (return of democracy, guerrilla fighting, etc) but the model reached its limits as the political system itself experienced a legitimacy crisis in the 1980s, ultimately leading to the failed coup d'état attempt by Chávez in 1992.Freed from prison and elected in 1998, Chávez ushered in a new era for the involvement of the armed forces in Venezuelan politics. His ideology, which blurs distinctions between civilian and military, has parallels with the idea of 'civic soldiers', a concept that refers to the dual nature of Cuban ruling elites after the Cuban Revolution. This new direction was initially met with opposition, and Chávez was deposed in a short-lived coup in 2002, facing a string of rebellions in 2002 and 2003.After re-consolidating power in the mid-2000s, he then initiated a process of transformation of the Venezuelan military by purging the institution of dissident officers, rewarding loyalty and weakening its command. The armed forces were given the direct management of state-owned companies and control of natural resource-rich areas, while also being placed under strict surveillance by intelligence agencies. One key development in the mid-2000s was the deepening of military ties between Havana and Caracas, with Cuban officer directly advising and training their Venezuelan counterparts.Crucially, the broad lines of the transformation of Venezuela's armed forces - reframing the military's mission, stripping its autonomy and reinforcing ideological realignment - had been applied successfully in Cuba by Raul Castro, who headed the Ministry of Defence until 2008. The Cuban model has enabled chavismo to outlive the death of its founder, much like "raulismo" ensured loyalty from the FAN without having to rely on Fidel's personal charisma and ascendancy over soldiers.In order to examine civil-military patterns in Venezuela, I will use within-case study methods to draw comparisons between different periods of Venezuelan history: early and late puntofijismo (1958-1998); the early Chávez years, between 1999-2012; and 2013-2020 (the Maduro years). Three foci will frame the analysis: firstly, how the military mission has been reframed in the context of national development and economic sovereignty, giving the armed forces a high stake in the regime; secondly, how the military's ability to pose an existential threat to the regime has been affected by changes that decreased its autonomy and created counterbalances to its power (e.g. the Bolivarian Militia and intelligence surveillance); and finally, how ideological indoctrination has occurred through a newly created network of military institutions, a new military training curriculum, and the recruitment and promotion of officers ideologically aligned with the regime.My research goals are i) to provide a historical and comparative institutional analysis of the key aspects that defined the institutional path taken by the armed forces in Venezuela; and ii) explore, through process tracing, the connections between events in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America. To my knowledge, never has such a holistic framework been applied to the study of civil-military relations in Venezuela since Chávez.