Virtually Inconceivable:The role of geopolitics in the European Union's foreign policy development in cyberspace

关于网络空间地缘政治竞争的流行说法是，网络空间主权之争主要发生在两个大国之间：美国和中国。这种叙事背后的现实主义和以国家为基础的理论假设赋予了国家进行网络战的能力，将其作为进入网络空间地缘政治“环”的金票。由于军事和情报能力薄弱（而且不是一个民族国家），欧盟（EU）被认为没有能力在网络领域推进其全球地缘政治野心。然而，欧盟也明确表达了在网络空间的主权诉求，并将自己的政策工具和网络规范推进到地缘政治上有争议的地区。这一发展挑战了文学中对网络空间的主要描述，但尚未得到探讨。因此，我的博士研究提出了这样一个问题：地缘政治因素是如何影响欧盟在网络空间中作为一种独特类型的外交政策参与者的演变的？欧盟作为网络战略参与者的发展对网络政治和国际关系理论有何影响？为了回答这些问题，我提出了一种解释性研究设计，以定性地考察2003-2020年欧盟网络外交政策的发展。通过查阅欧盟文件档案、政策文件和采访欧盟官员，我将构建欧盟外交政策发展的谱系，以阐明地缘政治和主权的特定概念是如何被各种欧盟外交政策制定者理解、谈判和阐述的。在这种谱系方法中，我将进行严格的话语分析，以追踪地缘政治和主权考虑如何以及在多大程度上影响了决策者对欧盟网络战略及其全球雄心的形成。这将使我能够递归地阐明地缘政治和主权的“意义”，因为它们已经在网络政策环境的背景下被应用和表现出来，从而“从头开始”构建我的理论。通过强调现有学术方法的局限性，并寻求“从头开始”构建地缘政治的网络ir理论，我的研究超越了传统的权力政治和基于国家的网络空间地缘政治解释。同时，我的方法考虑了欧洲一体化理论在一个新的政治舞台（网络空间）中的应用。然而，它的最终贡献超出了学术范畴：通过研究决策者如何在复杂的治理环境中理解和协商关键战略概念（地缘政治和主权），本研究将为未来网络环境中的外交和外交政策努力提供见解。

The prevalent narrative about geopolitical competition in cyberspace understands the struggle for sovereignty in cyberspace as chiefly occurring between two powerful states: the US and China. The realist and state-based theoretical assumptions underlying this narrative privilege states' capabilities to conduct cyberwarfare as the golden ticket to enter the geopolitical 'ring' in cyberspace. With weak military and intelligence capabilities (and not being a nation-state), the European Union (EU) is viewed as incapable of advancing its global geopolitical ambition in the cyber domain. Yet, the EU has also articulated sovereignty aspirations in cyberspace and advanced its own policy instruments and cyber norms into geopolitically contested regions. This development, which challenges dominant accounts of cyberspace in the literature, has not yet been explored. My doctoral research therefore asks, how have geopolitical considerations shaped the EU's evolution as a distinctive type of foreign policy actor in cyberspace? And what are the implications of the EU's development as a strategic cyber actor for theories of cyber politics and international relations? To answer these questions, I propose an interpretive research design to qualitatively examine the EU's cyber foreign policy development from 2003-2020. Through consulting EU document archives, policy documents, and interviewing EU officials, I will construct a genealogy of the EU's foreign policy development to elucidate how particular notions of geopolitics and sovereignty have been understood, negotiated, and articulated by various EU foreign policymakers. Throughout this genealogical approach, I will conduct rigorous discourse analyses to trace how, and to what extent, geopolitical and sovereignty considerations have shaped policymakers' formation of the EU's cyber strategy and its global ambitions over time. This will enable me to recursively elucidate the 'meanings' of geopolitics and sovereignty as they have been applied and represented in the context of the cyber policy environment, to therefore build my theory 'from the ground up'. By foregrounding the limitations of extant scholarly approaches and seeking to build a cyber-IR theory on geopolitics 'from the ground up', my research moves beyond the conventional power-politics and state-based explanations towards geopolitics in cyberspace. At the same time, my approach considers the application of European integration theories to a new political arena (cyberspace). Its ultimate contribution, however, extends beyond scholarship: by examining how policymakers understand and negotiate key strategic concepts (geopolitics and sovereignty) in complex governance settings, this research will produce insights for future diplomatic and foreign policy efforts in the cyber environment.