Hedging our (moral) bets: applying the methods of decision theory to decision-making under moral uncertainty

伦理学中一个未充分探讨的问题是，我们是否应该以及如何将我们对道德事实的不确定性纳入我们的决策。我们应该对冲我们的道德赌注吗？例如，一个人是否应该仅仅因为吃肉可能是可怕的错误而成为素食主义者，即使他们认为吃肉可能不是错误的？在我的论文中，我处理道德的不确定性，从规范决策理论的应用方法，评估“预期的选择价值最大化”-一种观点，根据这种观点，来自道德的不确定性的决策问题应该以类似的方式解决，使用相同的正式工具，作为非道德的决策问题。

An underexplored issue in ethics is whether and in what way we should factor our uncertainty about the moral facts into our decision-making. Should we hedge our moral bets? For example, should someone become vegetarian simply on the possibility that it is horrifically wrong to eat meat, even if they thought it probably wasn't wrong? In my thesis, I tackle moral uncertainty by applying methods from normative decision theory, evaluating 'expected choice-worthiness maximisation' - a view according to which decision problems stemming from moral uncertainty should be solved in a similar way, using the same formal tools, as non-moral decision problems.