Attribution of Cyber Incidents in International Diplomacy using Zero Knowledge Proofs

国家支持的网络行动受益于国际外交中缺乏适当的归属机制。尽管无法明确指出某个国家的行为者破坏了许多国家网络战略的威慑目标，但错误归因的代价是巨大的--可能导致不必要的冲突升级。如果这种判决涉及从秘密来源获得的情报，而受害国可能不愿透露这些情报，则会出现更复杂的情况。因此，鉴于国际法对动能武力使用的限制，网络空间在敌对国家行动中已变得越来越武器化。因此，该项目的重点是考虑采用技术方法来解决国际外交中网络归属的困难。零知识证明(ZKP)是一种数学构造，它允许信息在双方-证明者和验证者-之间进行验证，而不会被泄露。这一特征已经看到它们在要求高度机密性和完整性的环境中的应用(如分布式分类账技术和区块链)，使它们成为这方面的一个有吸引力的研究领域。因此，目前提议的方向是调查ZKP在国际外交信息共享方面的适宜性；特别是将网络渎职行为归因于国家行为者。

State-sponsored cyber operations benefit from a lack of a suitable attribution mechanism in international diplomacy. Whilst the inability to definitively point to a state actor undermines the deterrent objective of many states' cyber strategies, the cost of misattribution is great - potentially leading to unnecessary conflict escalation. Further complication arises where such judgements involve intelligence derived from clandestine sources, which victim states may be hesitant to divulge. As such, given limitations on the use of kinetic force in international law, cyberspace has become increasingly weaponised in hostile state action. The focus of this project is therefore to consider technical approaches to the difficulties of cyber attribution in international diplomacy. Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are mathematical constructs which allow information to be verified between parties - a prover and a verifier - without being divulged. This feature, which has seen their application in contexts requiring high confidentiality and integrity (such as distributed ledger technology and blockchain), makes them an attractive area for research in this regard. Thus, the currently proposed direction is to investigate the suitability of ZKPs in the context of information-sharing in international diplomacy; in particular, attributing acts of cyber malfeasance to state actors.