Prospects for a Ramseyan Pragmatism

我将讨论两个核心问题。首先，一个具有哲学史意义的问题：拉姆齐实用主义的起源和本质是什么？其次，一个具有哲学意义的问题：拉姆塞扬的实用主义作为一种哲学立场是如何发展的？在历史问题上，我已经拒绝谢丽尔·米萨克（Cheryl Misak）在剑桥实用主义（2016）中提出的对拉姆齐（Ramsey）的现在有影响力的解释。拉姆齐并不完全是c.s.皮尔斯风格的实用主义：相反，拉姆齐强调皮尔斯的观点只适用于“次要系统”（1990a, 161）。因此，拉姆塞实用主义是一种地方性的实用主义，它建立在区分初级和次级系统的基础上。在哲学博士课程中，我将深入研究这一关键区别；从《理论》（1990b）开始，拉姆齐在其中举例说明了这一区别，并继续到其早期草案（FPRP 005-17-01），以及“系统”的讨论起源于科学工作（Campbell 1920），以及维特根斯坦在同一时期关于“系统”的工作。我还将阐明拉姆齐在思想史上的地位。我将说明，拉姆齐的实用主义源于伯特兰·罗素20世纪20年代的实用主义、皮尔斯的实用主义和拉姆齐从青少年时期就开始信奉的极简现实主义三者的结合，拉姆齐在未完成的书草稿《论真理》（1991）中重申了这一点。至于拉姆齐的遗产，我将研究声称拉姆齐的观点对维特根斯坦产生了影响的论点，并不仅考虑拉姆齐的观点与维特根斯坦成熟哲学之间的关系，还考虑最近的论点（例如Boncompagni 2017），即拉姆齐特别将维特根斯坦推向了他的中期阶段（c.1929-1944）。转向哲学前沿：我将把拉姆塞的实用主义与其他实用主义的作品进行比较，以证明它不仅与众不同，而且引人注目。与全球实用主义不同（Price 2013, Brandom 1994），拉姆塞扬的实用主义可以抵制来自“缓慢的极简主义”的现实主义论点（Dreier 2004, Williams 2013）；与准现实主义（Blackburn 1998）和其他地方实用主义不同，“本地化”的主次区分抵制了“不稳定”的论点。因此，我将捍卫拉姆塞实用主义，不受霍尔顿和普莱斯（2003年）专门针对拉姆塞实用主义的“不稳定性”论点的影响，也不受普莱斯在其他地方（1996年，2015年，麦克阿瑟和普莱斯2007年）针对地方实用主义的影响。我的主要研究方法将是研究大量的一手和二手文献。为了确保我对拉姆齐的工作和生活的了解是详尽的，主要文献将包括拉姆齐个人和专业，出版和未出版的全部作品。其中一些材料保存在匹兹堡大学的弗兰克·普朗普顿·拉姆齐档案中（可以通过数字方式获得）；一些传记材料由剑桥国王学院档案馆保存。主要文献还包括拉姆齐的同时代人和同事：主要是罗素和维特根斯坦，还有查尔斯·奥格登、马克斯·纽曼和理查德·布雷斯韦特。这种阅读（包括潜在的手稿材料）将确保我能够自信地重建拉姆齐作品的知识背景。次要文献将主要由实用主义和反表征主义的文献组成，必须对拉姆齐作品的潜在哲学优点（或缺点）进行评估。我将尽可能多地学习和参与历史和当代实用主义者（如美国实用主义者，威尔弗里德·塞拉斯，理查德·罗蒂，露丝·密立根，罗伯特·布兰顿，希拉里·普特南，休·普莱斯）的工作，以解决这些关于当地和全球实用主义的问题。二手文献还将包括关于后tractatus Wittgenstein的文献，以及实用主义科学哲学人物的作品（例如Philip Kitcher， Hasok Chang）。

I will address two central questions. Firstly, a question of significance for history of philosophy: what was the origin and nature of Frank Ramsey's pragmatism? Secondly, a question of philosophical significance: how does this Ramseyan pragmatism fare as a philosophical position?On the historical question, I already reject Cheryl Misak's now influential interpretation of Ramsey, presented in Cambridge Pragmatism (2016). His was not entirely a pragmatism in the vein of C. S. Peirce: rather, Ramsey was emphatic that Peirce's view governs only 'secondary systems' (1990a, 161). Ramseyan pragmatism is therefore a local pragmatism that rests on a distinction between primary and secondary systems. In the DPhil, I will examine this crucial distinction in depth; starting with Theories (1990b), wherein Ramsey exemplifies the distinction, and continuing to an earlier draft thereof (FPRP 005-17-01), and the scientific work from which the talk of 'systems' originated (Campbell 1920), and Wittgenstein's contemporaneous work on das erste / zweite System.I will also clarify Ramsey's place in the history of ideas. I will show that Ramsey's pragmatism resulted from a three-way marriage between the insights of Bertrand Russell's 1920s pragmatism, Peirce's pragmatism, and a minimalist realism to which Ramsey had subscribed since his teenage years, which he reprised in the unfinished book draft, On Truth (1991). As for Ramsey's legacy, I will examine arguments purporting that Ramsey's views exerted influence on Wittgenstein, and consider not only the relationship between Ramsey's ideas and Wittgenstein's mature philosophy, but also recent arguments (e.g. Boncompagni 2017) that Ramsey specifically pushed Wittgenstein into his middle phase(s) (c.1929-1944).Turning to the philosophical front: I will compare Ramseyan pragmatism with other pragmatist offerings to demonstrate that it is not only distinctive but compelling. Unlike global pragmatisms (Price 2013, Brandom 1994), Ramseyan pragmatism can resist realist arguments from 'creeping minimalism' (Dreier 2004, Williams 2013); and unlike quasi-realism (Blackburn 1998) and other local pragmatisms, the 'localising' primary-secondary distinction resists 'instability' arguments. I will thus defend Ramseyan pragmatism from the 'instability' arguments levelled specifically at it by Holton and Price (2003), and from those aimed generally at local pragmatisms by Price elsewhere (1996, 2015, Macarthur and Price 2007).My principal research method will be to study a large volume of primary and secondary literature. To ensure my knowledge of Ramsey's work and life is exhaustive, the primary literature will include the entire body of writing-personal and professional, published and unpublished-produced by Ramsey. Some of these materials reside in the Frank Plumpton Ramsey archive at the University of Pittsburgh (which is available digitally); some biographical materials are held by the King's College Cambridge archive. The primary literature will also include Ramsey's contemporaries and associates: principally Russell and Wittgenstein, but also Charles Ogden, Max Newman and Richard Braithwaite. This reading (including potential manuscript material) will ensure that I can confidently reconstruct the intellectual context for Ramsey's work. The secondary literature will consist mostly of the literature on pragmatism and anti-representationalism, against which potential philosophical merits (or demerits) of Ramsey's work must be assessed. I will study and engage as much as possible of the work of historical and contemporary pragmatists (e.g. the American pragmatists, Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Rorty, Ruth Millikan, Robert Brandom, Hilary Putnam, Huw Price) to address those questions about local and global pragmatism. Secondary literature will also include the literature on post-Tractatus Wittgenstein, and work from figures in the pragmatist philosophy of science (e.g. Philip Kitcher, Hasok Chang).