Improving Decision-Making Systems Through Judicial Review

我提出的研究旨在挑战“在司法审查案件中，人们强调要确定对索赔人造成实际伤害的具体错误决定”（Adams-Prassl和Adams-Prassl，2020），而是考虑如何在具体案件具体化之前，利用司法审查来识别和解决系统层面的问题。我确定了两个主题，在当代司法审查是不够的行政法奖学金解决。首先，个人索赔者在利用行政法司法机制方面面临越来越多的不可逾越的障碍。第二，法院看到越来越多的案件中，索赔人问题的根源不是对他们的案件作出的个人决定，而是有关行政部门决定所有案件所依据的总体政策，因为这些政策在促进现代行政管理方面是有用的。这些问题是密切相关的，因为在某些情况下，政府政策受到质疑的基础上，他们阻碍了诉诸司法。我认为，为了有效地解决这些挑战和连贯性，有必要面对我们的一些最基本的假设，司法审查程序应该如何运作。也就是说，我们必须问，司法审查是否必须始终采取同样的形式：一般来说，这是一个由个人索赔人提出的挑战，他们正在寻求补救，因为非法的行政决定已经对他们造成了一些错误。我将研究英国法院对政府政策的司法审查的方法，特别是最高法院最近在R（A）和BF（厄立特里亚）一案中的裁决，确立了一项三方检验标准，用以确定一项政策在普通法中是否违法。我将详细考虑上诉法院以前关于“在超过最低数量的案件中造成重大违法风险”的政策的判例，最高法院在R（A）案中裁定，这一原则不作为三方测试的独立原则存在。然后，我将评估随后的政策挑战，如贝尔诉塔维斯托克，如何应用最高法院的推理，以评估三方测试解决系统层面的不公正的潜力，以及任何陷阱。鉴于政策审查和诉诸司法之间的密切关系，我将研究潜在的行政法诉讼人所面临的障碍，并考虑是否有一种新的方法来代表问题-有针对性的运动组织可以帮助填补由此产生的司法“空白”。为此，我将研究竞选立场的理论和案例法，追溯到世界发展运动。我将特别注意善法项目最近的工作，作为一个具有非常广泛的组织章程的组织，法院认为该组织试图通过普遍致力于促进善治来为自己建立地位。我认为这是一个典型的案例，表明一个组织寻求先发制人，而不是事后补救公共错误，并将调查在这种模式之后建立一个官方监督机构是否有好处。重新认识司法审查，使其不依赖于个人索赔人对具体决定提出质疑，这开辟了一种可能性，即将其视为一个沟通性更强的过程，明确关注良好和透明决策的公共利益。在一个政府和新闻界对司法审查申请人持敌视态度的时代，对行政和司法之间关系的新理解，即认为法院支持而不是阻碍治理工作，可能是非常受欢迎的。我将研究这些系统层面的司法审查诉讼方法如何促进政府不同部门之间的新形式的沟通和合作，符合司法审查的“绿灯”理论（Harlow和Rawlings，202

My proposed research aims to challenge the 'received emphasis on identifying a specific erroneous decision which has resulted in actual harm to the claimant' (Adams-Prassl and Adams-Prassl, 2020) in judicial review cases, and instead consider how judicial review can be used to identify and tackle problems at a system level before they concretise in individual cases. I identify two themes in contemporary judicial review which are insufficiently addressed in administrative law scholarship. Firstly, individual claimants face ever more insurmountable barriers to accessing the mechanisms of justice in administrative law. Secondly, the courts are seeing more cases in which the root of a claimant's problem is not an individual decision taken about their case, but the overarching policy according to which the relevant executive department decides all cases, given the usefulness of such policies in facilitating modern administration. These issues are closely interrelated, as in some cases government policies are challenged on the basis that they hinder access to justice.I believe that in order to address these challenges effectively and coherently, it is necessary to confront some of our most fundamental assumptions about how the judicial review process should operate. Namely, we must ask whether judicial review must always take the same form: typically, a challenge brought by an individual claimant who is seeking redress for some wrong already done to them by an unlawful executive decision.I will examine the English courts' approach to judicial review of government policy, in particular the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in R (A) and BF (Eritrea) establishing a tripartite test for finding a policy to be unlawful at common law. I will consider in detail the line of previous Court of Appeal jurisprudence on policies which create a 'significant risk of unlawfulness in more than a minimal number of cases', which was held by the Supreme Court in R (A) not to exist as a separate principle from the tripartite test. I will then evaluate how subsequent policy challenges, such as Bell v Tavistock, have applied the Supreme Court's reasoning, in order to assess the potential of the tripartite test for tackling system-level injustice, as well as any pitfalls.Given the close relationship between policy review and access to justice, I will examine the barriers facing would-be administrative law litigants and consider whether a new approach to standing for issue-focused campaign organisations could help to fill the resulting justice 'gap'. To this end I will study the theory and case law of campaign standing, going back to World Development Movement. I will pay particular attention to the recent work of the Good Law Project, as an organisation with very broad articles of association which has been viewed by the courts as attempting to create standing for itself through a general commitment to promoting good governance. I see this as the paradigm case of an organisation seeking to pre-empt rather than retrospectively remedy public wrongs, and will investigate whether there would be benefits to creating an official watchdog after this model.Reconceptualising judicial review such that it does not depend on individual claimants challenging specific decisions opens up the possibility of viewing it as a far more communicative process, concerned explicitly with the public interest in good and transparent decision-making. In an age of government and press hostility towards judicial review claimants, a new understanding of the relationship between the executive and the judiciary that views the courts as supporting rather than hindering the work of governance may be very welcome. I will investigate how these system-level approaches to judicial review litigation could facilitate new forms of communication and cooperation between the different branches of government, in line with a 'green-light' theory of judicial review (Harlow and Rawlings, 202