Causation, Identity, and Nature of Temporal Parts

我的研究项目将使用因果关系来制定一个新的理论之间的时间部分的连接。这将解决三个重要的研究问题：什么是时间部分？时间部分是如何连接的？我们能否用这种联系来回答与时间部分相关的其他问题，比如它们与现在主义和“模糊边界”的兼容性？ 由刘易斯（1976; 1986）推广，时间部分通常用于形而上学，以解释对象如何在时间的变化中生存下来。认为物体在空间和时间上都是延伸的（具有空间和时间部分）的观点被称为持久论。持续主义者将空间和时间部分视为相似的，但这一观点的挑战者质疑时间部分如何相互连接以及它们所属的整个对象（Lowe，1998; Tallant，2018）。我试图通过建立在刘易斯（1976）发展的同一性关系的基础上，发展一种对时间部分之间联系的解释。在讨论时间旅行者时，刘易斯认为，将一个人的时间部分彼此联系起来的是他们之间适当水平的心理连续性和连通性。刘易斯认为，一个实体的这种连续性和连通性不仅仅是偶然的，而是可以用因果关系来解释的。因为一个时间部分的属性因果地依赖于位于其之前的那些时间部分。我希望提供一个完整的解释，就是因果关系作为时间部分之间的纽带的概念。虽然刘易斯用这个来理解四维时间旅行者的概念，但这个理论的结果还没有得到充分的探索。我提出了一个帐户的时间部分区分其连通性的空间部分之间的连通性。这种区别将把我的项目与其他试图使用因果关系来帮助绑定时间部分的作品区分开来，例如Hawley（2001）和Armstrong（1997）。虽然这些理论以类似于我提出的解决方案的方式使用因果关系，但它们并没有将我们对时间部分的理解与我们对空间部分的理解分开。我认为，这种区别使我的理论能够更好地回应对一般因果方法提出的异议。此外，虽然围绕对时间部分提出的反对意见及其对变化问题的解决方案进行了大量讨论（Hawley，2020），但辩论并不集中在连续时间部分之间的联系上。我所提出的项目将有助于解决这一重大的研究空白。我试图通过花一年的时间来研究我的每个关键研究问题，来实现对时间部分的新理解。我将致力于我的第一年的研究回顾文献的帐户的时间部分。这将最终回答“什么是时间部分？“，从而将我的工作嵌入现有的文献中，并确保我的解决方案处于当前讨论的最前沿。在我的第二年，我将通过发展刘易斯的同一性关系，参考关于情态和反事实因果关系的文献，发展我自己对时间部分通过因果关系联系起来的解释。这将回答“时间部分是如何连接的？“通过提供一种新的因果关系解释作为时间部分之间的约束。我的第三年将致力于评估我的帐户。我将展示我们如何使用这种因果关系来回答与时间部分相关的其他问题，从而回答我的最后一个研究问题。我将展示如何理解时间部分之间的因果关系提供了两个重要问题的解决方案。第一个问题是关于带有时间部分的对象将具有的明显的“模糊”边界。第二个问题涉及时间部分及其与时间本体论的独特争论的关系。

My research project will use causation to formulate a new theory of the connections between temporal parts. This will address three significant research questions: What are temporal parts? How are temporal parts connected? Can we use this connection to answer other issues associated with temporal parts, such as their compatibility with presentism and 'fuzzy boundaries'? Popularised by Lewis (1976; 1986), temporal parts are commonly employed in metaphysics to account for how objects can survive changes through time. The view that objects are both spatially and temporally extended (have spatial and temporal parts) is known as perdurantism. Perdurantists treat spatial and temporal parts as analogous, but challengers to this view question how temporal parts connect to one another and to the whole objects to which they belong (Lowe, 1998; Tallant, 2018). I seek to develop an account of the connection between temporal parts by building upon the identity relation developed by Lewis (1976). When discussing a time traveller, Lewis argues that what ties the temporal parts of a person to one another is an appropriate level of mental continuity and connectedness between them. Lewis argues that this continuity and connectedness of an entity are not merely accidental, rather they are explicable in terms of causation. For the properties of one temporal part causally depends on those temporal parts that sit before. It is this notion of causation as the tie between temporal parts that I wish to provide a full account of. Whilst Lewis uses this to understand the notion of a four-dimensional time traveller, the upshot of this theory has not been sufficiently explored. I propose an account of temporal parts which distinguishes their connectedness from the connectedness between spatial parts. This distinction will separate my project from other works that have sought to use causation to help bind temporal parts, such as Hawley (2001) and Armstrong (1997). Whilst these theories employ causation in a similar way to my proposed solution, they do not focus on divorcing our understanding of temporal parts from our understanding of spatial parts. This distinction, I argue, gives my theory the ability to respond better to objections raised to the general causal approach. Further, whilst there has been significant discussion around objections raised to temporal parts and their solution to the problems of change (Hawley, 2020), the debate does not focus on the connection between successive temporal parts. My proposed project will help to address this significant research lacuna.I seek to achieve this novel understanding of temporal parts by dedicating a year to each of my key research questions. I will dedicate my first year of research to reviewing the literature on accounts of temporal parts. This will ultimately answer the question of "what are temporal parts?", thus embedding my work into the existing literature and ensure that my solutions are at the forefront of the current discussion. In my second year, I shall develop my own account of temporal parts as connected through causation by developing Lewis' identity relation, with reference to the literature on modality and counterfactual causation. This will answer the question "how are temporal parts connected?" by providing a new account of causation as the bind between temporal parts. My third year will be devoted to evaluating my account. I will demonstrate how we can use this causal connection to answer other issues associated with temporal parts, thus answering my final research question. I will demonstrate how understanding the connection between temporal parts as causal provides solutions to two significant problems. The first problem concerns the apparent 'fuzzy' boundaries that an object with temporal parts will have. The second concerns temporal parts and their relation to the distinct debate of temporal ontology.