The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Reevaluating Cognitive Behavioural Therapy as treatment for Phobias

我博士的背景是关于感知和认知之间的边界的哲学辩论(斯托克斯2021)。这是一个极具争议性的问题，植根于知觉哲学，但哲学的不同领域在哪里相交，哲学在哪里与认知科学相遇。在我的本科和硕士论文的基础上，在第一部分中，我的目标是在基础问题上提出一个新的视角，在第二部分中，我将把这一点应用到传统的知觉哲学范围之外，建立对恐惧症的新理解。我将从三个关键问题来构建我的博士学位。第一部分从我们如何区分知觉和认知这一基本问题开始。我会争辩说，知觉和认知之间有一条边界，但这条边界漏洞百出。我的目的是证明知觉的被动性和认知的能动性，揭示了知觉和认知虽然是不同的，但同时发挥着作用，是不断对应的。我将探索认知对注意力的影响，进而探讨注意力对知觉的影响，以疏忽失明为例(Simon&Chabra，2010)。在假设知觉和认知之间有一个漏洞百出的边界时，我假设知觉在认知上是可穿透的，这自然导致了我的第二个问题：这一假设是否站得住脚？我的目的是通过将隐性偏见作为一个案例研究，来证明这一点。在西格尔(2017)关于感知合理性的研究中，我认为隐含的种族偏见可以在认知上渗透到我们的视觉体验中，导致我们在感知本身上非理性地歧视少数群体。在第二部分，我转向我的第三个问题，这个框架是否可以被应用到感知哲学的典型范围之外。我认为它可以，特别是在增强当前对恐惧症的理解方面。我的起点将是对认知情绪的探索(Nussbaum，2004)。我会争辩说，我们可以将这些理解为认知上穿透的感知经验，从而解释了三个显著的特征：它们的直接性；对理性判断的免疫力；以及它们对行为的强大影响。我将把恐惧症作为认知情绪的一个案例研究，在这个案例中，治疗既成功又失败。这使我能够调查为什么恐惧症有时会抵制理性干预，而有时会做出反应。我的目的是用认知渗透对恐惧症知觉体验的不同影响来解释这一点。我的方法有三个。首先，运用传统的哲学探究方法：概念分析、现象学描述和理论建构。第二，通过探索知觉的认知科学模型进行跨学科的参与，第三，利用经验心理学(临床和其他)来为我对恐惧症的讨论提供依据。这项工作将在哲学和其他方面产生影响：为关于知觉/认知边界的传统辩论提供新的想法，也为认知行为疗法作为治疗恐惧症的方法的发展提供了基础。如果我的博士学位的总体框架是正确的，那么我们应该期待认知治疗干预不仅适用于判断和行为，而且适用于知觉体验本身。

The context of my PhD is philosophical debate about the boundary between perception and cognition (Stokes 2021). This is a highly contested issue, anchored in the philosophy of perception, but where different areas of philosophy cross paths, and where philosophy meets cognitive science. Building on my undergraduate and MA dissertations, in Part 1 I aim to set out a new perspective on the foundational issues, and in Part 2 I apply this beyond the traditional scope of philosophy of perception, developing a new understanding of phobias.I will structure my PhD in terms of three key questions. Part 1 begins with the foundational question of how we are to distinguish perception and cognition. I will argue there is a border between perception and cognition, but a porous one. I aim to show that the passivity of perception, and activity in cognition, reveal that perception and cognition, though distinct, function simultaneously, in constant correspondence. I will explore the influence of cognition on attention, and, in turn, the influence of attention on perception, taking as a case study inattentional blindness (Simon & Chabris, 2010).In supposing a porous border between perception and cognition, I assume that perception is cognitively penetrable, which leads naturally to my second question: is this assumption defensible? I aim to argue that it is, by focusing on implicit bias as a case study. Developing Siegel's (2017) work on the rationality of perception, I argue that implicit racial biases can cognitively penetrate our visual experiences, causing us to irrationally discriminate against minority groups in perception itself. In Part 2, I turn to my third question of whether this framework can be applied beyond the typical confines of philosophy of perception. I argue that it can, specifically in enhancing current understanding of phobias.My starting point will be an exploration of cognitive emotions (Nussbaum, 2004). I will argue that we can understand these as cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences, thereby explaining three notable characteristics: their immediacy; immunity to rational judgement; and their powerful influences on behaviour. I will take phobias as a case study of cognitive emotions, where therapy both succeeds and fails. This enables me to investigate why phobias are sometimes resistant to rational intervention and other times responsive. I aim to explain this in terms of differential influences of cognitive penetration on phobic perceptual experiences.My methods are threefold. First, employing the traditional methods of philosophical inquiry: conceptual analysis; phenomenological description; and theory building. Second, undertaking cross-disciplinary engagement by exploring cognitive scientific models of perception, and third drawing on empirical psychology (clinical and otherwise) to inform my discussion of phobias.This work will be impactful in philosophy and beyond: contributing new ideas to the traditional debate about the perception/cognition border, but also supplying grounds for the development of cognitive behavioural therapy as treatment for phobias. If the overall framework of my PhD is correct, then we should expect cognitive therapeutic interventions to apply not only to judgements and behaviour, but to perceptual experiences themselves.