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Efficient Exchange Mechanisms for Services and Configurable Goods

Efficient Exchange Mechanisms for Services and Configurable Goods
高效的服务和可配置商品交换机制
批准号:
RGPIN-2016-06679
负责人:
Kersten, Gregory
金额:
$1.97万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
加拿大
项目类别:
Discovery Grants Program - Individual
财政年份:
2018
资助国家:
加拿大
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2018-01-01 至 2019-12-31

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
精益生产和准时制生产是现代供应链管理的核心。其执行取决于按照交易过程中商定的规格生产的货物(生产周期仅在下订单后开始)。服务通常以类似的方式进行配置和交付,即在需要时进行配置和交付。物联网为制造和服务提供过程提供了新的机会,因为它允许机器与其制造商和服务提供商之间的自动通信。* 这些事态发展给货物和服务的采购带来了新的挑战;要求迅速采购,但在采购过程中需要进行配置。拍卖已成为一种有用的机制,因为它们很容易建立,而且时间效率高。多属性逆向拍卖(MARA)使交易过程中商品和服务的配置成为可能。然而,MARA的效率取决于准线性假设,即价格和配置是独立的,成本对市场参与者和整个经济都很重要。尽管已知准线性不是一个现实的假设,但还没有提出不依赖于该假设的MARA机制。* 如果不满足准线性假设,那么在许多情况下,从MARA获得的有效合同可能会联合改进。虽然一个获胜的合同是有效的,但有效边界可能是这样的,即选择另一个合同并伴随着卖方的侧向支付增加了买方和卖方的盈余。这种合同对双方都有利,因为它们节省了费用,并提高了采购货物的质量。* 采购-供应链的关键职能之一-控制着企业总成本的25%至85%。采购成本平均占总支出的1%;拍卖可以节省2%至12%的成本。 使用MARA可以采购价值更高的商品和服务,而成本保持不变或更低;一项研究表明,MARA可以节省12亿美元,占总成本的20%。违反准线性假设意味着低效率可能接近50%。本项目提出了不依赖于这一假设的新的交换机制的设计和实施。拟议的机制考虑到有效边界的类型,要么要求买方转移到拍卖后的谈判中,卖方提出修订的合同或自动探测可行的一套寻找联合改进。这些采购机制将在实验室和在线实验中得到广泛测试,并用于教学和培训。它们的实际意义在于它们可能带来的节省。**
英文摘要
Lean manufacturing and just-in-time production are essential in modern supply chain management. Their implementation depends on the goods produced to the specifications agreed upon during the transaction process (the production cycle starts only after the order is placed). Services are often configured and delivered in a similar manner, that is, when they are needed. Internet-of-things provides new opportunities to manufacturing and service delivery processes in that it allows for automated communication between machines and their manufacturers and service providers. ***These developments create new challenges for the procurement of goods and services; there is a requirement that they be procured quickly and yet they need to be configured during the procurement. Auctions have become a useful mechanism because they are easy to set up and are time-efficient. Multi-attribute reverse auctions (MARA) make the configuration of goods and services during the transaction possible. However, MARA's efficiency depends on the quasi-linearity assumption that price and configuration are independent and the costs are of any importance for market participants and the economy as a whole. Although it is known that quasi-linearity is not a realistic assumption, yet no MARA mechanisms that do not rely on this assumption have been proposed. ***If the quasi-linearity assumption is not met then, in many situations, the efficient contracts obtained from MARA may be jointly improved. Although a winning contract is efficient, the efficient frontier may be such that the selection of another contract accompanied with the seller's side-payment increases the surplus for both the buyer and the seller. Such contracts are beneficial for both sides because they create savings and increase the quality of the procured goods. ***Procurement--one of the key supply chain functions--controls between 25% and 85% of an enterprise's total costs. The costs of the procurement average 1% of the total spent; auctions can save between 2% and 12 % of the costs. The use of MARA allows for the procurement of goods and services that have greater value while the cost remains the same or is lower; one study shows that MARA could save $1.2 billion which was 20% of the total costs.***The violation of the quasi-linearity assumption means that inefficiencies may approach 50%. This project proposes the design and implementation of new exchange mechanisms that do not rely on this assumption. The proposed mechanisms take into account the type of efficient frontier and either require that the buyers move to post-auction negotiations in which the sellers propose revised contracts or automatically probe the feasible set searching for joint improvements. These procurement mechanisms will be extensively tested in lab and online experiments and used in teaching and training. Their practical significance lies in the savings that they may bring. **
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Efficient Exchange Mechanisms for Services and Configurable Goods
  • 批准号:
    RGPIN-2016-06679
  • 项目类别:
    Discovery Grants Program - Individual
  • 资助金额:
    $1.97万
  • 财政年份:
    2019
  • 负责人:
    Kersten, Gregory
  • 依托单位:
Efficient Exchange Mechanisms for Services and Configurable Goods
  • 批准号:
    RGPIN-2016-06679
  • 项目类别:
    Discovery Grants Program - Individual
  • 资助金额:
    $1.97万
  • 财政年份:
    2017
  • 负责人:
    Kersten, Gregory
  • 依托单位:
Efficient Exchange Mechanisms for Services and Configurable Goods
  • 批准号:
    RGPIN-2016-06679
  • 项目类别:
    Discovery Grants Program - Individual
  • 资助金额:
    $1.97万
  • 财政年份:
    2016
  • 负责人:
    Kersten, Gregory
  • 依托单位:
Principal-agent software environments for multi-attribute auctions and multi-bilateral negotiations
  • 批准号:
    6755-2011
  • 项目类别:
    Discovery Grants Program - Individual
  • 资助金额:
    $1.53万
  • 财政年份:
    2015
  • 负责人:
    Kersten, Gregory
  • 依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Exchange环理论
  • 批准号:
    19801012
  • 项目类别:
    青年科学基金项目
  • 资助金额:
    4.2万元
  • 批准年份:
    1998
  • 负责人:
    陈焕艮
  • 依托单位: