地方政府公共政策执行行为选择机制的演化博弈分析

本项目拟从演化博弈的视角研究地方政府基于利益驱动的公共政策执行行为选择如何导致公共政策执行失灵的内在机理。项目拟从地方政府公共政策执行行为的概念界定入手，在厘清公共政策执行博弈过程中中央政府、地方政府以及政策目标群体等利益主体的成本-收益函数并系统探析地方政府政策执行行为选择影响因素的基础上，从理论上建构“政策执行环境-政策执行行为-政策执行绩效”的分析框架；根据该理论分析框架分别构建地方政府单总体、地方政府和中央政府双总体以及中央政府、地方政府和社会公众三总体政策执行系列演化博弈模型，继而通过改革开放以来我国公共政策执行的历史回顾和地方政府政策执行力测评指标体系和绩效评价指标体系的构建以及量化环境因素的面板数据回归分析，从宏观和微观层面验证地方政府的政策执行绩效；通过对公共政策执行演化博弈规律的揭示，促进公共政策执行研究的知识增长，进而为我国地方政府政策执行的行为优化提供理论支持。

From the perspective of evolutionary game theory, this study aims at research on the local government’s behavioral choice of public policy implementation which is driven by its interests and the mechanism of public policy implementation failure because of this behavioral choice. It defines the concept of local government's public policy implementation, clarifies the cost-benefit function of the central government, local government and the public as the target group in the process of public policy implementation game. It constructs the theoretical analysis framework of “policy implementation environment-implementation behavior-implementation performance” based on the analysis of the factors influencing local government's public implementation behavioral choice. According to the theoretical analysis framework, it constructs the single-population evolutionary game model of local government, the two-population model of local government and central government, and the three-population model of central government, local government and the public. It verifies the policy implementation performance of the local government at the macro-and micro-level:at the macro-level it reviews the history of public policy implementation in China,and at the micro-level, it constructs the evaluation index system and performance evaluation index system of local government's policy mplementation and analyses the quantitative environmental factors influencing the policy implementation behavioral choice by the panel data regression. Finally,it improves the growth of knowledge in public policy implementation research by revealing the law of its evolutionary game, further to provide the theoretical support for optimizing public policy implementation behavior in local government of China.