Moral choices: The influence of the "Do not play God" principle
Moral choices: The influence of the "Do not play God" principle
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道德选择：“不扮演上帝”原则的影响
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发表时间：
2013
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
F. Mancini
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作者：
F. Mancini
道德选择：“不扮演上帝”原则的影响阿米莉亚·甘吉米(Gangia Gangemi)认知科学部，通过Concezione，6 Messina，98121-意大利Francesco Mancini(Mancini@apc.it)Scuola di Psicoterapia Cognitiva，Viale Castro Pretorio，116，罗马，00185-广泛的文献表明，人们更喜欢由不作为造成的伤害，而不是由行为造成的同等或较小的伤害。这种遗漏偏见的解释参考了几个原则，如因果关系或责任。Sunstein(2005)提出了一个令人信服的研究观点：当道德直觉反映了“不扮演上帝”的原则时，有害的行为通常比有害的不作为更糟糕：不作为对“自然秩序”的干扰较少。在两个初步研究中，我们使用有轨电车问题的Switch版本，检验了“不扮演上帝”原则对个体道德偏好的影响。研究1表明，我们的参与者对他们不采取行动的选择的理由明确地指的是不干预“自然秩序”的意图。研究2表明，影响主人公决策自主性降低的刺激(如权威)激活了“不扮演上帝”原则，导致他们倾向于不采取行动。关键词：遗漏偏见；道德选择；电车困境；不扮演上帝原则。导言很常见的一种直觉是，对于医生来说，杀死一名患有致命疾病的患者，然后让他通过不接受任何形式的医疗干预而死亡，这是很糟糕的。后果主义哲学家认为，这些情况应该被同等地考虑(Singer，1979)。相反，在一些控制良好的实验中，巴伦和他的同事们表明，人们认为有害行为比有害的遗漏更糟糕，否则结果是相同的、可预测的(即遗漏偏见)。例如，Spranca，Minsk和Baron(1991)表明，当有人想要伤害某人时，人们会比当她被动地观看不知道自己服用这种成分的人时，感觉更糟糕。Ritov和Baron(1990)也使用疫苗接种来说明这种偏见：许多人认为接种疫苗的危害风险比不接种疫苗的风险更严重。这种偏见似乎影响了真正的疫苗接种决定(Asch等人，1994；Meszaros等人，1996)，并且在几种情况下被复制(例如Royzman&Baron，2002；Baron&Leshner，Wroe和Salkovskis(2000)解释这种选择，认为大多数人认为自己对他们积极做的事情比他们没有做的事情更负责，这种疏忽偏见是由于感知到的因果关系的差异和责任程度的不同而发生的。特别是，根据这些作者的说法，参与者对佣金不道德的判断取决于几个通常区分不作为和佣金的因素，例如佣金中的身体动作。相反，Sunstein(2005)认为，当个人的道德直觉反映出对“不扮演上帝”原则的过度概括时，有害的行为通常比有害的不作为更糟糕：不作为或不作为对“自然秩序”的干扰较小。与委托书相比，遗漏的负面道德分量一般较小，对个人命运的干预也较少。让我们回到医生，他决定让病人死而不进行任何形式的医疗干预。根据常识，与同一名医生给病人开出的药物很快就会杀死他的情况相比，这种情况在道德上被认为是较少的负面影响。但是，前一种情况(暂停任何医疗，即遗漏)并不意味着比第二种决定(给予致命药物，即佣金)更少的责任或身体活动：医生可以要求将患者从急诊室转移，或者可以继续拔掉管子或导管，或者最后通过向护士传达他的指示并监督他们如何遵循这些指示。换句话说，与Wroe和Salkovskis(2000)相反，有害的不作为并不一定意味着比行动更少的责任或身体行动。从这个角度来看，行动和不作为之间没有区别。那么，它们之间有什么区别呢？根据桑斯坦的假设，遗漏选择对“自然秩序”(在这个例子中是病人的命运)的影响较小，不违反“不扮演上帝”的原则，这将产生差异。这就像人们说的：没有人可以声称拥有决定某人生死的权利，即使S明确要求死亡。S/他只能跟随和适应事件。此外，Haidt和Baron(1999)表明，有害行为和不作为之间的区别消失了(即不作为具有相同的道德影响力
Moral choices: The influence of the “Do not play God” principle Amelia Gangemi (gangemia@unime.it) Department of Cognitive Science, Via Concezione, 6 Messina, 98121- Italy Francesco Mancini (mancini@apc.it) Scuola di Psicoterapia Cognitiva, Viale Castro Pretorio, 116, Rome, 00185 - Italy Abstract A wide literature demonstrates that people prefer harm caused by omissions over equal or lesser harm caused by actions. This omission bias has been explained referring to several principles, such as causality or responsibility. A convincing research view has been suggested by Sunstein (2005): harmful acts are generally worse than harmful omissions when moral intuitions reflect the “Do not play God” principle: inactions interfere less with the “natural order.” In two preliminary studies, we examine the influence of the “Do not play God” principle on individuals moral preferences, using the switch version of the trolley problem. Study 1 demonstrates that our participants’ justifications for their inaction choice explicitly refer to the intention of not interfering with the “natural order”. Study 2 demonstrates that the presence of stimuli influencing a reduction of protagonist’s decisional autonomy (e.g. an authority) activates the “Do not play God” principle, leading them to prefer inaction. Keywords: Omission bias; Moral choices; Trolley dilemma; “Do not play God” principle. Introduction It’s quite common the intuition that it is worse for a doctor to kill a patient with a deadly disease then let him die by abstaining from any kind of medical intervention. Consequentialist philosophers argue that these cases should be considered equivalently (Singer, 1979). In a number of well-controlled experiments Baron and colleagues have shown instead that people consider harmful acts worse than harmful omissions with otherwise identical, predictable outcomes (i.e., omission bias). For example, Spranca, Minsk and Baron (1991) showed that people find it worse when somebody who wants to harm a person offers this person a food item with an allergenic ingredient than when she passively watches the person who does not know about the ingredient taking this item himself. Ritov and Baron (1990) used also vaccination to illustrate the bias: many people consider the risk of harm from vaccination as more serious than the risk from omitting vaccination. This bias seems to affect real vaccination decisions (Asch et al., 1994; Meszaros et al., 1996), and it has been replicated in several situations (e.g. Royzman & Baron, 2002; Baron & Leshner, Wroe and Salkovskis (2000) explain this kind of choices arguing that most people regard themselves as more responsible for what they actively do than what they fail to do, and that this omission bias occurs due to perceived differences in causality and differing degrees of responsibility. In particular, according to these authors participants’ judgments about the immorality of commission depend on several factors that ordinarily distinguish omission and commission, such as physical movements in commission. Sunstein (2005) suggests instead that harmful acts are generally worse than harmful omissions when individuals’ moral intuitions reflect an overgeneralization of the “Do not play God” principle: omissions or inactions interfere less with the “natural order.” Omission generally carries less negative moral weight than commission, intervening less in individual’s destiny. Let’s go back to the doctor who decides to let a patient die by refraining from any kind of medical intervention. According to the common sense, this case is considered less morally negative than the case in which the same doctor gives the patient a medication that quickly kills him. But the former case (to suspend any medical treatment, i.e. the omission) does not imply less responsibility or physical movements than the second decision (to give a deadly medication, i.e. the commission): the doctor could ask to move the patient from the emergency room, or could proceed by removing tubes or catheters, or finally by communicating the nurses his instructions and supervising how they follow them. In other words, contrary to Wroe and Salkovskis (2000), the harmful omission could not necessarily imply less responsibility or physical movements than actions. From this point of view there are no differences between action and omission. So what does differentiate them? According to Sunstein’s hypothesis, the omission choice has less impact on the “natural order” (in the example the patient’s destiny), not violating the “do not play God” principle, and this would make the difference. It’s like people say: nobody can claim the right to decide over the life and death of someone, even if s/he explicitly asks to die. S/he can only follow and adapt to the events. Moreover, Haidt and Baron (1999) showed that the differences between harmful actions and omissions disappear (i.e. the omission has the same moral weight of
影响因子：
5.4
作者：
J. Haidt
通讯作者：
J. Haidt