Power Side Channels in Security ICs: Hardware Countermeasures
Power Side Channels in Security ICs: Hardware Countermeasures
复制标题
安全 IC 中的电源侧通道：硬件对策
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Taylor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lu Zhang;Luis Vega;M. Taylor
功率侧通道攻击是一种非常有效的密码分析技术，可以通过监视功耗来推断安全性IC的秘密键。自从90年代后期出现实践攻击以来，它们一直是许多配备加密摄影设备的主要威胁，包括智能卡，加密的FPGA设计和手机。加密设备的设计师和制造商为了响应而开发了各种保护的对策。攻击方法也已经演变为抵抗抗性实现。本文回顾了基础功率分析攻击技术，并检查了各种硬件设计缓解。目的是突出基于硬件的对策中的暴露漏洞，以实现更安全的实现。
Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis technique that can infer secret keys of security ICs by monitoring the power consumption. Since the emergence of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a major threat to many cryptographic-equipped devices including smart cards, encrypted FPGA designs, and mobile phones. Designers and manufacturers of cryptographic devices have in response developed various countermeasures for protection. Attacking methods have also evolved to counteract resistant implementations. This paper reviews foundational power analysis attack techniques and examines a variety of hardware design mitigations. The aim is to highlight exposed vulnerabilities in hardware-based countermeasures for future more secure implementations.
针对差分功耗分析的随机时钟
DOI：
10.1109/apccas.2010.5774887
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
Boey K
通讯作者：
Boey K