Perfect Foresight and Equilibrium Selection in Symmetric Potential Games
Perfect Foresight and Equilibrium Selection in Symmetric Potential Games
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对称势博弈中的完美预见与均衡选择
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2485
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
G. Sorger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Hofbauer;G. Sorger
松井和松山的均衡选择方法(J.Econ.Theory65(1995)，415-434)是基于理性博弈者最大化其贴现的未来收益，分析了具有势函数的对称两人博弈。证明了势函数的极大化是小贴现率下吸收且全局可达的唯一状态。经济文献杂志分类编号：C72。
The equilibrium selection approach of Matsui and Matsuyama (J. Econ. Theory65(1995), 415–434) which is based on rational players who maximize their discounted future payoff, is analyzed for symmetric two-player games with a potential function. It is shown that the maximizer of the potential function is the unique state that is absorbing and globally accessible for small discount rates.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
KANDORI, M;MAILATH, GJ;ROB, R
通讯作者：
ROB, R