Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) in Developing a Representational Theory of Mind.
Perceptual Access Reasoning (PAR) in Developing a Representational Theory of Mind.
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感知访问推理（PAR）在发展心理表征理论。
DOI：
10.1111/mono.12432
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发表时间：
2021-09
影响因子：
9.5
通讯作者：
Spinrad, Tracy L.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fabricius, William V.;Gonzales, Christopher R.;Pesch, Annelise;Weimer, Amy A.;Pugliese, John;Carroll, Kathleen;Bolnick, Rebecca R.;Kupfer, Anne S.;Eisenberg, Nancy;Spinrad, Tracy L.
儿童社会和认知发展的一个重要部分是他们理解人是具有内在精神状态的心理存在，包括欲望，意图，感知和信仰。要充分理解人作为心理存在物，需要一种表征性心理理论（Representational Theory of Mind，ToM），即理解心理状态可以忠实地表征现实，也可以歪曲现实。在过去的35年里，研究人员一直依赖错误信念任务作为黄金标准来测试儿童对信念可能歪曲现实的理解。在错误信念任务中，孩子们被要求对那些对情况有错误信念的代理人的行为进行推理。虽然大量的证据表明，大多数儿童在学龄前结束时通过了错误信念任务，但我们在本专著中提出的证据表明，大多数儿童直到童年中期才理解错误信念，甚至是真正的信念。我们认为，幼儿通过错误信念任务，而不理解错误信念使用知觉访问推理（PAR）。在PAR中，孩子们理解看到会导致当下的认知，但并不理解认知也会产生于思考，或者在情况发生变化后作为记忆和信念而持续存在。同样，PAR会导致孩子在真信念任务中失败。PAR理论可以解释表征心理理论和相关任务的其他传统测试的表现，并且可以解释与真实信念和错误信念表现相关或影响真实信念和错误信念表现的因素。该理论提供了一种新的实验室测量方法，我们称之为信念理解量表（BUS）。这个量表可以区分患有PAR的孩子和理解信念的孩子。该量表提供了一种研究表征心理理论发展所需的方法。在这本专著中，我们报告的测试结果，我们已经进行了PAR理论产生的预测。研究结果表明，在假设儿童使用PAR的年龄段，PAR在推理心理方面存在局限性。在第二章中，对已发表的真实信念文献的二次分析显示，儿童未能完成几种类型的真实信念任务。第三章至第九章描述了2003年至2014年间从580名4-7岁儿童以及14名成年人的小样本中收集的多项研究的新经验数据。参与者从亚利桑那州凤凰城大都市区招募。所有参与者均为英语母语者。儿童是从大学资助的和社区的幼儿园和日托中心，以及医院的产科病房招募的。成年人是大学生谁参加了部分满足课程要求的研究参与。社会计量学数据仅在第九章中收集，并在该章中全面报告。在第三章中，任务程序的微小改变导致儿童在3选项错误信念任务中的表现存在很大差异。在第四章中，我们报告的结果表明，儿童的理解无知和理解错误信念之间的发展滞后比以往的研究报告的滞后时间更长。在第五章中，孩子们没有区分有错误信念的行为人和没有信念的行为人。在第六章中，研究结果表明，孩子们发现推理正确的信念并不比推理错误的信念更容易。在第七章中，当儿童被要求在错误信念任务中证明他们的正确答案时，他们没有引用代理人的错误信念。同样，在第八章中，当儿童被要求解释代理人在错误信念任务中的行为时，他们没有提到代理人的错误信念。在第九章中，被确定使用PAR的儿童与理解信仰的儿童在三个维度上存在差异--社会发展水平、抑制性控制和幼儿园适应。沿着。虽然研究结果需要复制和额外的研究的替代解释，本专著中报告的结果收集挑战的普遍看法，即代表性的心理理论是在学龄前结束。此外，研究结果的模式是一致的建议，PAR是代表性心理理论的发展前兆。目前的研究结果也对婴儿和幼儿表现出ToM相关能力的说法提出了质疑，并且代表性ToM是天生的。
An important part of children's social and cognitive development is their understanding that people are psychological beings with internal, mental states including desire, intention, perception, and belief. A full understanding of people as psychological beings requires a representational theory of mind (ToM), which is an understanding that mental states can faithfully represent reality, or misrepresent reality. For the last 35 years, researchers have relied on false‐belief tasks as the gold standard to test children's understanding that beliefs can misrepresent reality. In false‐belief tasks, children are asked to reason about the behavior of agents who have false beliefs about situations. Although a large body of evidence indicates that most children pass false‐belief tasks by the end of the preschool years, the evidence we present in this monograph suggests that most children do not understand false beliefs or, surprisingly, even true beliefs until middle childhood. We argue that young children pass false‐belief tasks without understanding false beliefs by using perceptual access reasoning (PAR). With PAR, children understand that seeing leads to knowing in the moment, but not that knowing also arises from thinking or persists as memory and belief after the situation changes. By the same token, PAR leads children to fail true‐belief tasks. PAR theory can account for performance on other traditional tests of representational ToM and related tasks, and can account for the factors that have been found to correlate with or affect both true‐ and false‐belief performance. The theory provides a new laboratory measure which we label the belief understanding scale (BUS). This scale can distinguish between a child who is operating with PAR versus a child who is understanding beliefs. This scale provides a method needed to allow the study of the development of representational ToM. In this monograph, we report the outcome of the tests that we have conducted of predictions generated by PAR theory. The findings demonstrated signature PAR limitations in reasoning about the mind during the ages when children are hypothesized to be using PAR. In Chapter II, secondary analyses of the published true‐belief literature revealed that children failed several types of true‐belief tasks. Chapters III through IX describe new empirical data collected across multiple studies between 2003 and 2014 from 580 children aged 4–7 years, as well as from a small sample of 14 adults. Participants were recruited from the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area. All participants were native English‐speakers. Children were recruited from university‐sponsored and community preschools and daycare centers, and from hospital maternity wards. Adults were university students who participated to partially fulfill course requirements for research participation. Sociometric data were collected only in Chapter IX, and are fully reported there. In Chapter III, minor alterations in task procedures produced wide variations in children's performance in 3‐option false‐belief tasks. In Chapter IV, we report findings which show that the developmental lag between children's understanding ignorance and understanding false belief is longer than the lag reported in previous studies. In Chapter V, children did not distinguish between agents who have false beliefs versus agents who have no beliefs. In Chapter VI, findings showed that children found it no easier to reason about true beliefs than to reason about false beliefs. In Chapter VII, when children were asked to justify their correct answers in false‐belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. Similarly, in Chapter VIII, when children were asked to explain agents’ actions in false‐belief tasks, they did not reference agents’ false beliefs. In Chapter IX, children who were identified as using PAR differed from children who understood beliefs along three dimensions—in levels of social development, inhibitory control, and kindergarten adjustment. Although the findings need replication and additional studies of alternative interpretations, the collection of results reported in this monograph challenges the prevailing view that representational ToM is in place by the end of the preschool years. Furthermore, the pattern of findings is consistent with the proposal that PAR is the developmental precursor of representational ToM. The current findings also raise questions about claims that infants and toddlers demonstrate ToM‐related abilities, and that representational ToM is innate.
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