Towards an organisational perspective on party funding: Explaining financial transfers from MEPs to their national parties

Towards an organisational perspective on party funding: Explaining financial transfers from MEPs to their national parties
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从组织角度看待政党资金:解释欧洲议会议员向本国政党的资金转移

DOI:
10.1111/j.1475-6765.2012.02068.x
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发表时间:
2012
影响因子:
5.3
通讯作者:
Bolleyer N
Bolleyer N
中科院分区:
法学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Bolleyer N

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在欧洲议会(EP)中有哪些政党能够从他们的议员工资中定期提取捐款,如果他们提取捐款,他们有多伟大?在关于政党财政的文献中,对利用当选代表的薪金作为资金来源的问题缺乏关注。这是令人惊讶的,因为欧洲许多政党的全国总部定期收取“政党税”:他们当选代表的工资的固定(而且往往很大)份额。为了填补这一空白,本文从理论上详细说明了两套政党特征,分别解释了征税规则和税收水平的存在。税收的存在取决于这种内部义务的基本“可接受性”,这种内部义务依赖于政党向其欧洲议会议员提供的竞选资金捐款与欧洲议会议员向其政党提供的工资捐款之间的互利金融交换。相反,税收水平取决于组织内部合规成本的水平和各方科普这些成本的能力。与第二阶段有关的三个因素是:欧洲议会议员的意识形态立场、议会党团的规模和政党对候选人提名的控制。该框架通过一个选择模型进行测试,该模型应用于一个独特的数据集,该数据集涵盖了欧盟成员国各缔约方的征税做法。
Which parties represented in the European Parliament (EP) are able to extract regular donations from their MEPs' salaries and, if they extract donations, how great are they? In the literature on party finances, there has been a lack of attention paid to the use of salaries of elected representatives as a source of funding. This is surprising given that the national headquarters of many parties in Europe regularly collect ‘party taxes’: a fixed (and often significant) share of their elected representatives' salaries. In filling this gap, this article theoretically specifies two sets of party characteristics that account for the presence of a taxing rule and the level of the tax, respectively. The presence of a tax depends on the basic ‘acceptability’ of such an internal obligation that rests on a mutually beneficial financial exchange between parties' campaign finance contributions to their MEPs and MEPs' salary donations to their parties. The level of the tax, in contrast, depends on the level of intra‐organisational compliance costs and parties' capacity to cope with these costs. Three factors are relevant to this second stage: MEPs' ideological position, the size of the parliamentary group and party control over candidate nomination. The framework is tested through a selection model applied to a unique dataset covering the taxing practices in parties across the European Union Member States.
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