Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory
Backing Out or Backing In? Commitment and Consistency in Audience Costs Theory
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退出还是退出？
DOI：
10.1111/ajps.12197
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Geoffrey P. R. Wallace
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Levy;Michael K. McKoy;Paul Poast;Geoffrey P. R. Wallace
受众成本理论认为，国内公众会因为领导人发出外部威胁然后退缩而惩罚他们。推动这种惩罚的一个关键机制涉及公众对领导人言论和行动一致性的重视。如果这是真的，那么这种机制不仅应该在领导人未能实施威胁时发挥作用，而且应该在他们未能履行远离冲突的荣誉时发挥作用。我们用一个调查实验来研究国内对总统决定从公共威胁中“退缩”并“回到”国外冲突的反应。我们发现，在这两种情况下，总统都失去了支持，但“退出”比“支持”遭受的痛苦更大。这些不同的后果部分是由于公众对待新信息的不对称。我们的研究结果强烈表明，对一致性的关注加强了受众成本理论，并且无论领导者最初的政策路线如何，都会对不一致性进行惩罚
Audience costs theory posits that domestic publics punish leaders for making an external threat and then backing down. One key mechanism driving this punishment involves the value the public places on consistency between their leaders’ statements and actions. If true, this mechanism should operate not only when leaders fail to implement threats, but also when they fail to honor promises to stay out of a conflict. We use a survey experiment to examine domestic responses to the president's decision to “back down” from public threats and “back into” foreign conflicts. We find the president loses support in both cases, but suffers more for “backing out” than “backing in.” These differential consequences are partially explained by asymmetries in the public's treatment of new information. Our findings strongly suggest that concerns over consistency undergird audience costs theory and that punishment for inconsistency will be incurred, regardless of the leader's initial policy course
英国公众的观众成本：升级、危机类型和首相言论的影响
影响因子：
2.6
作者：
Davies G
通讯作者：
Davies G