How to Split a Theory: Defending Selective Realism and Convergence without Proximity
How to Split a Theory: Defending Selective Realism and Convergence without Proximity
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如何分裂理论：捍卫选择性现实主义和不接近的趋同
DOI：
10.1093/bjps/axr059
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
David Harker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David Harker
科学实在论最有影响力的论点仍然集中关注从科学成功到成功理论的近似真理的推论。然而，最近，为了回应反实在论者对科学史中激进的不连续性的反对，这些论点已经得到了完善。现实主义者不会针对整个理论，而是将他们的承诺缩小到理论的某些部分。尽管最初的可行性，选择性现实主义的战略面临着重大挑战。在这篇文章中，我概述了一个成功的选择性现实主义辩护的四个先决条件，并认为，采用一个比较意义上的成功既满足了这些要求，并在一定程度上提供了一个更令人信服的，虽然更温和，现实主义的论文。1引言2选择性现实主义辩护的理由3成功、进步和一个新的选择性现实主义论题 3.1现实主义者思考科学成功的新方法 3.2区分两种现实主义承诺 3.3一个新的选择性现实主义命题 3.4为了趋同和反对依赖解释性美德4选择性现实主义辩护的理由再访5历史素描 5.1光学以太理论 5.2燃素理论 5.3达尔文、高尔顿和魏斯曼关于世代和遗传的观点 5.4理论变化时的稳定性6结论1引言2选择性实在论辩护的理由3成功、进步和新的选择性实在论论题 3.1现实主义者思考科学成功的新方法 3.2区分两种现实主义承诺 3.3一个新的选择性现实主义命题 3.4支持趋同，反对依赖解释性美德 3.1现实主义者思考科学成功的新方法 3.2区分两种现实主义承诺 3.3一个新的选择性现实主义命题 3.4为了趋同和反对依赖解释性美德4选择性现实主义辩护的理由再访5历史素描 5.1光学以太理论 5.2燃素理论 5.3达尔文、高尔顿和魏斯曼关于世代和遗传的观点 5.4理论变化时的稳定性 5.1光学以太理论 5.2燃素理论 5.3达尔文、高尔顿和魏斯曼关于世代和遗传的观点 5.4理论变化时的稳定性
The most influential arguments for scientific realism remain centrally concerned with an inference from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories. Recently, however, and in response to antirealists' objections from radical discontinuity within the history of science, the arguments have been refined. Rather than target entire theories, realists narrow their commitments to only certain parts of theories. Despite an initial plausibility, the selective realist strategy faces significant challenges. In this article, I outline four prerequisites for a successful selective realist defence and argue that adopting a comparative sense of success both satisfies those requirements and partially in consequence provides a more compelling, albeit more modest, realist thesis. 1 Introduction 2 Requisites for a Selective Realist Defence 3 Success, Progress, and a New Selective Realist Thesis 3.1 A new way for realists to think about scientific success 3.2 Distinguishing two realist commitments 3.3 A new selective realist thesis 3.4 For convergence and against relying on explanatory virtues 4 Requisites for a Selective Realist Defence Revisited 5 Historical Sketches 5.1 Optical aether theories 5.2 Phlogiston theory 5.3 Darwin, Galton, and Weissmann on generation and inheritance 5.4 Stability across theory change 6 Conclusions 1 Introduction 2 Requisites for a Selective Realist Defence 3 Success, Progress, and a New Selective Realist Thesis 3.1 A new way for realists to think about scientific success 3.2 Distinguishing two realist commitments 3.3 A new selective realist thesis 3.4 For convergence and against relying on explanatory virtues 3.1 A new way for realists to think about scientific success 3.2 Distinguishing two realist commitments 3.3 A new selective realist thesis 3.4 For convergence and against relying on explanatory virtues 4 Requisites for a Selective Realist Defence Revisited 5 Historical Sketches 5.1 Optical aether theories 5.2 Phlogiston theory 5.3 Darwin, Galton, and Weissmann on generation and inheritance 5.4 Stability across theory change 5.1 Optical aether theories 5.2 Phlogiston theory 5.3 Darwin, Galton, and Weissmann on generation and inheritance 5.4 Stability across theory change 6 Conclusions
当经验的成功意味着理论参考时：结构对应定理
DOI：
10.1093/bjps/axn049
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
影响因子：
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作者：
Schurz
通讯作者：
Schurz