Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms
Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms
复制标题
再分配机制
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
S. Kominers
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Akbarpour;Piotr Dworczak;S. Kominers
许多稀缺的公共资源是以低于市场出清的价格分配的，有时甚至是免费的。这种“非市场”机制牺牲了一些盈余，但它们有可能改善公平。我们开发了一个模型的机制设计与再分配的关注。代理人的特点是私人观察到的愿意支付质量，一个公开观察的标签，和社会福利的权重。市场设计者控制一组异质质量对象的分配和定价，并最大化福利函数的期望。设计者不直接观察个人的社会福利权重。我们获得结构的见解的形式的最佳机制，导致一个框架，以确定如何以及何时使用非市场机制。
Many scarce public resources are allocated at below-market-clearing prices and sometimes for free. Such “nonmarket” mechanisms sacrifice some surplus, yet they can potentially improve equity. We develop a model of mechanism design with redistributive concerns. Agents are characterized by a privately observed willingness to pay for quality, a publicly observed label, and a social welfare weight. A market designer controls allocation and pricing of a set of objects of heterogeneous quality and maximizes the expectation of a welfare function. The designer does not directly observe individuals’ social welfare weights. We derive structural insights about the form of the optimal mechanism, leading to a framework for determining how and when to use nonmarket mechanisms.
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00517.x
发表时间：
2005-12
期刊：
Macroeconomics eJournal
影响因子：
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作者：
Heidrun C. Hoppe-Wewetzer;B. Moldovanu;A. Sela
通讯作者：
Heidrun C. Hoppe-Wewetzer;B. Moldovanu;A. Sela