Regulation of non-marketed outputs and substitutable inputs

Regulation of non-marketed outputs and substitutable inputs
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对非市场化产出和可替代投入的监管

DOI:
10.1007/s11149-017-9348-4
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发表时间:
2018
影响因子:
1.1
通讯作者:
S. Hagspiel
S. Hagspiel
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
J. Bertsch;S. Hagspiel

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本文研究了基于多种可替代投入提供非市场化产出的垄断企业的规制问题。监管机构能够观察到规定的有效性,但在公司活动的效率方面面临信息不对称。具体而言,我们考虑一种设置,其中一个输入和输出是可观察的,而另一个输入和相关成本是不可观察的。多维信息不对称性是由投入之间的边际替代率函数形式和投入成本的离散分布引入的。对于这种新的设置,我们研究了理论上最优的贝叶斯监管机制。我们发现,第一个最好的解决方案,不能得到的情况下,影子成本的公共资金。第二最佳解决方案意味着最有效的类型与第一最佳输入水平的分离,以及所有其他类型的向上扭曲(潜在的聚束)可观察输入水平。此外,我们将这些结果与更简单的非贝叶斯方法进行比较,即,单一的联营合同,因此,弥合了学术讨论和监管实践之间的差距。在数值模拟中,我们确定了某些条件下,一个单一的合同非贝叶斯监管确实可以接近第二个最好的解决方案的贝叶斯菜单的合同监管。
We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm that provides a non-marketed output based on multiple substitutable inputs. The regulator is able to observe the effectiveness of the provision, but faces information asymmetries with respect to the efficiency of the firm’s activities. Specifically, we consider a setting where one input and the output are observable, while another input and related costs are not. Multi-dimensional information asymmetries are introduced by discrete distributions for the functional form of the marginal rate of substitution between the inputs as well as for the input costs. For this novel setting, we investigate the theoretically optimal Bayesian regulation mechanism. We find that the first-best solution cannot be obtained in case of shadow costs of public funding. The second-best solution implies separation of the most efficient type with first-best input levels, and upwards distorted (potentially bunched) observable input levels for all other types. Moreover, we compare these results to a simpler non-Bayesian approach, i.e., a single pooling contract, and hence, bridge the gap between the academic discussion and regulatory practice. In a numerical simulation, we identify certain conditions in which a single contract non-Bayesian regulation can indeed get close to the second-best solution of the Bayesian menu of contracts regulation.
激励监管的理论与实践
DOI: --
发表时间: 1994
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者:
Thomas P. Lyon
通讯作者: Thomas P. Lyon
DOI: --
发表时间: 1985
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者:
David Besanko
通讯作者: David Besanko