Injection of Public Funds into Banks under Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation
Injection of Public Funds into Banks under Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation
复制标题
在存款保险和银行监管下向银行注入公共资金
DOI：
10.1057/9780230288140_4
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hiroshi Osano
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hiroshi Osano
本文讨论了在存在存款保险的情况下，监管者向银行注入公共资金的最优性，并给出了一个防止银行采取道德风险行为的最优注入策略。我们证明了在一定条件下，监管者的最优政策是向银行注入新的现金资金。此外，如果监管机构没有足够的银行信息，监管机构可以通过购买利率为零的次级债券向银行注入公共资金;另一方面，如果监管机构有足够的银行信息，监管机构可以通过购买优先股向银行注入公共资金。但是，我们也指出，这种注入政策不能独立于监管机构的银行关闭政策：效率低下的银行应该关闭。作者感谢帕特里克博尔顿、井出一郎和小林川一郎提供的有益意见。
We discuss the optimality of the regulator injecting public funds into a bank in the presence of deposit insurance, and characterise an optimal injection policy to prevent the bank from taking moral hazard action. We show that under certain conditions, the regulator’s optimal policy is to inject new cash funds into the bank. Furthermore, if the regulator does not have enough information on the bank, the regulator can inject public funds into the bank through the purchase of subordinated bonds by setting the interest rate equal to zero; on the other hand, if the regulator has enough information on the bank, the regulator may inject public funds into the bank through the purchase of preferred stocks. However, we also indicate that this kind of injection policy cannot be independent of the bank closure policy of the regulator: inefficient banks should be closed. The author is grateful to Patrick Bolton, Ichiro Ide and Shuji Kobayakawa for helpful comments.
影响因子：
4
作者：
Douglas Gale;M. Hellwig
通讯作者：
Douglas Gale;M. Hellwig