Bunching at the kink: implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts.
Bunching at the kink: implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts.
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.011
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发表时间：
2017-03
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Schrimpf P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Einav L;Finkelstein A;Schrimpf P
A large literature in empirical public finance relies on “bunching” to identify a behavioral response to non-linear incentives and to translate this response into an economic object to be used counterfactually. We conduct this type of analysis in the context of prescription drug insurance for the elderly in Medicare Part D, where a kink in the individual’s budget set generates substantial bunching in annual drug expenditure around the famous “donut hole”. We show that different alternative economic models can match the basic bunching pattern, but have very different quantitative implications for the counterfactual spending response to alternative insurance contracts. These findings illustrate the importance of modeling choices in mapping a compelling reduced form pattern into an economic object of interest.
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DOI：
10.1162/rest_a_00518
发表时间：
2015-10
期刊：
The review of economics and statistics
影响因子：
--
作者：
Aron-Dine A;Einav L;Finkelstein A;Cullen M
通讯作者：
Cullen M
影响因子：
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作者：
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通讯作者：
Williams, Jonathan W.
影响因子：
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作者：
Chetty, Raj;Friedman, John N.;Saez, Emmanuel
通讯作者：
Saez, Emmanuel
影响因子：
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作者：
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通讯作者：
Waseem, Mazhar
DOI：
10.1257/aer.103.1.178
发表时间：
2013-02
期刊：
The American economic review
影响因子：
--
作者：
Einav L;Finkelstein A;Ryan S;Schrimpf P;Cullen MR
通讯作者：
Cullen MR