Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account
Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account
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断言、行动和信念的知识和其他规范：目的论说明
DOI：
10.1111/phpr.12222
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Neil Mehta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Neil Mehta
在这里，我对断言、行动和信念的认识论规范性的结构提出了一个统一的描述。根据我的目的论描述，所有这些都是认识论上的成功，只要它们满足了知识性的主要目标，而这个目标反过来又产生了一系列次要的认识规范。目的论的核心特征是：它紧凑地依赖于单一的中心解释假设，坚持以知识为中心，坚持知识设定基本的认识规范，但在承认不同于知识的丰富的认识规范的合法性和价值方面，它具有强烈的多元性。我认为，在很大程度上，由于这种多元化的特征，目的论的描述远远优于现有的以知识为中心的描述。
Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account, all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge-centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge-centered accounts.
断言的知识规范
影响因子：
0.7
作者：
Brown J
通讯作者：
Brown J