THE KNOWLEDGE NORM FOR ASSERTION

THE KNOWLEDGE NORM FOR ASSERTION
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断言的知识规范

DOI:
10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00139.x
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发表时间:
2010
影响因子:
0.7
通讯作者:
Brown J
Brown J
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Brown J

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我将只集中讨论巴赫那篇内容广泛且内容丰富的论文中提出的一个问题,即知识与断言之间的联系。在威廉姆森之后,认为知识是断言的准则的观点变得流行起来。这一假设是情境主义者和他们的反对者之间关于正确解释知识的辩论的核心。DeRose(2002)认为,断言的知识规范倾向于语境主义者的主张,即“知道”是一个语境敏感的术语,在不同的语境中表达不同的性质。相比之下,霍桑(2004)使用知识规范来支持他最喜欢的不变论版本,我将其称为‘主体敏感不变论’。不变论者认为,“知道”表达的是一种单一的性质。不变论的不同版本在它们允许影响知识归属的真理的因素的范围上是不同的。所谓经典不变论认为,S是否真正相信p是知识,取决于S关于p的证据、S是否相信p是可靠形成的等因素。根据主体敏感不变论,S是否知道p也取决于对S的利害关系,取决于p为真对S有多重要(Hawthorne 2004,Stanley 2005,and Fantl and McGrath即将到来)。要评估这些说法,重要的是弄清楚知识范数到底是什么。威廉姆森(2000)在他的经典讨论中认为,断言受构成规范的支配,断言p只有在一个人知道p(241)的情况下才能断言。在他的语境主义论证中,DeRose(2002)使用了知识规范的双条件版本来论证语境主义:
I will focus on just one of the issues raised in Bach's wide-ranging and rich paper, the connection between knowledge and assertion. Following Williamson, it has become popular to hold that knowledge is the norm of assertion. The assumption is central to the debate between contextualists and their opponents about the correct account of knowledge. DeRose (2002) argues that the knowledge norm for assertion favours the contextualist claim that'know'is a context-sensitive term which expresses different properties in different contexts. By contrast, Hawthorne (2004) uses the knowledge norm to support his favoured version of invariantism, which I will call'subject sensitive invariantism'. Invariantists hold that'know'expresses a univocal property. Different versions of invariantism differ over the range of factors that they allow affect the truth of knowledge ascriptions. So-called'classic invariantist'views hold that whether S's true belief that p is knowledge depends on such factors as S's evidence for p, and whether S's belief that p was formed reliably. According to subject-sensitive invariantism, whether S knows that p also depends on the stakes for S, on how important it is to S that p be true (Hawthorne 2004, Stanley 2005, and Fantl and McGrath forthcoming).To assess these claims, it is important to clarify exactly what the knowledge norm amounts to. In his classic discussion, Williamson (2000) argues that assertion is governed by the constitutive norm, assert p only if one knows that p (241). In his argument for contextualism, DeRose (2002) uses a bi-conditional version of the knowledge norm to argue for contextualism:
DOI: 10.1215/00318108-2006-010
发表时间: 2006-10-01
影响因子: 3.5
作者:
Douven, Igor
通讯作者: Douven, Igor
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00664.x
发表时间: 2007-12-01
期刊: NOUS
影响因子: 2.1
作者:
Lackey, Jennifer
通讯作者: Lackey, Jennifer
DOI: 10.1215/00318108-114-2-227
发表时间: 2005-04-01
影响因子: 3.5
作者:
Weiner, Matthew
通讯作者: Weiner, Matthew
将实用主义应用于认识论
DOI: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00138.x
发表时间: 2008
影响因子: 0.7
作者:
K. Bach
通讯作者: K. Bach
断言、知识和背景
DOI: 10.1215/00318108-111-2-167
发表时间: 2002
期刊: The Philosophical Review
影响因子: --
作者:
Keith DeRose
通讯作者: Keith DeRose