Market-based pollution regulations with damages Varying across space: When the adoption of clean Technology is socially optimal

Market-based pollution regulations with damages Varying across space: When the adoption of clean Technology is socially optimal
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基于市场的污染监管,造成损害 不同空间的污染监管不同:当采用清洁技术对社会而言是最优的时

DOI:
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发表时间:
2018
期刊:
Advances in Management & Applied Economics
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Minggao Xue
Minggao Xue
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Xiaoyan Wang;Minggao Xue

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对于目前由政府管制的大部分污染,造成的损害取决于排放源的位置。以市场为基础的差别化政策,包括差别化税收和差别化排放交易,旨在通过差别化的排放惩罚来反映空间差异损害。我们从采用清洁技术的角度评估差异化政策。在均衡中,企业可能会按照监管者最初的预期行事,将企业的边际损害等同于其边际减排成本;否则,监管者会设定较低(较高)的税率或交易比率,以刺激企业不采用清洁技术。因此,有区别的政策导致社会最佳程度的采用。它们为高损害地区的公司采用清洁技术提供了更大的激励。然而,当考虑到不完全信息或不确定性时,差别化政策的效果可能并不优于现有的基于市场的政策。过度投资或投资不足都是可能的。此外,我们研究了一个特殊的情况下,边际损害是常数。这表明,即使减排成本不完全,差别化税收仍然可以诱导社会最优采纳。
For much of the pollution currently regulated by governments, resulting damages depend on the locations of emission sources. Market-based differentiated policies including differentiated taxes and differentiated emissions trading are designed to reflect spatially variant damages with differentiated emissions penalties. We evaluate differentiated policies from the perspective of clean technology adoption. In equilibrium, a firm may act as what regulator initially expects, which equates the firm’s marginal damage to its marginal abatement cost; or else, the regulator sets a lower (higher) tax rate or trading ratio to stimulate the firm not to (to) adopt clean technology. Accordingly, differentiated policies lead to the socially optimal degree of adoption. And they provide greater incentives for firms in high damage locations to adopt clean technology. However, when imperfect information or uncertainty is considered, differentiated policies may not perform better than existing market-based policies. Overinvestment or underinvestment is possible. Moreover, we study a special case where marginal damages are constant. It shows differentiated taxes could still induce the socially optimal adoption even with incompleteness about abatement costs.
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