Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?
Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?
复制标题
论证的规范理论：某些规范比其他规范更好吗？
作者：
A. Corner;U. Hahn
规范，即我们应该做什么的规范，在非正式论证的研究中起着关键的作用，就像它们在判断、决策和推理的研究中所起的作用一样。具体来说，它们引导了一个反复出现的主题：人们理性吗？虽然规则和标准一直是研究推理和行为的核心，但心理学内部很少讨论为什么（或者是否）它们应该被视为规范性的，尽管有相当多的哲学文献与这个主题有关。在本文中，我们问什么使某件事成为规范，既考虑了一般的规范，也考虑了一个具体的例子：非正式论证的规范。我们的结论是，这是可能的和可取的调用规范理性的论点，贝叶斯方法提供了坚实的规范性原则，这样做。
Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal argumentation, as they do in studies of judgment, decision-making and reasoning more generally. Specifically, they guide a recurring theme: are people rational? Though rules and standards have been central to the study of reasoning, and behavior more generally, there has been little discussion within psychology about why (or indeed if) they should be considered normative despite the considerable philosophical literature that bears on this topic. In the current paper, we ask what makes something a norm, with consideration both of norms in general and a specific example: norms for informal argumentation. We conclude that it is both possible and desirable to invoke norms for rational argument, and that a Bayesian approach provides solid normative principles with which to do so.
影响因子：
4.3
作者：
Breen, Mara;Clifton, Charles, Jr.
通讯作者：
Clifton, Charles, Jr.