Cache Shaping: An Effective Defense Against Cache-Based Website Fingerprinting

Cache Shaping: An Effective Defense Against Cache-Based Website Fingerprinting
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缓存整形:针对基于缓存的网站指纹识别的有效防御

DOI:
10.1145/3508398.3511500
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发表时间:
2022
期刊:
CODASPY '22: Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Wang, Boyang
Wang, Boyang
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Li, Haipeng;Niu, Nan;Wang, Boyang

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基于缓存的网站指纹攻击可以通过测量CPU缓存活动来推断用户访问的网站。研究表明,攻击者可以通过监控整个Last Level cache的占用情况,以较低的采样率实现较高的准确率。尽管已经提出了一种防御方法,但当攻击者使用被防御的数据来适应和重新训练分类器时,这种防御方法并不有效。在本文中,我们提出了一种新的防御方法,称为缓存整形,以保护用户隐私免受基于缓存的网站指纹攻击。我们提出的防御通过引入虚拟I/O操作和实现多个进程来产生虚拟缓存活动,从而在用户访问网站时隐藏指纹。我们在从多个web浏览器和操作系统收集的大规模数据集上的实验结果表明,即使攻击者使用防御缓存跟踪重新训练分类器,我们的防御仍然有效。我们通过利用深度神经网络作为分类器,展示了我们在封闭世界和开放世界环境下的防御效果。
Cache-based website fingerprinting attacks can infer which website a user visits by measuring CPU cache activities. Studies have shown that an attacker can achieve high accuracy with a low sampling rate by monitoring cache occupancy of the entire Last Level Cache. Although a defense has been proposed, it was not effective when an attacker adapts and retrains a classifier with defended data. In this paper, we propose a new defense, referred to as cache shaping, to preserve user privacy against cache-based website fingerprinting attacks. Our proposed defense produces dummy cache activities by introducing dummy I/O operations and implementing with multiple processes, which hides fingerprints when a user visits websites. Our experimental results over large-scale datasets collected from multiple web browsers and operating systems show that our defense remains effective even if an attacker retrains a classifier with defended cache traces. We demonstrate the efficacy of our defense in the closed-world setting and the open-world setting by leveraging deep neural networks as classifiers.
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